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Abstract
This Comment explores the various legal methods designed to protect cultural property and
to prevent its illegal removal. Part I examines both international and U.S. efforts to prevent illegal
removals of cultural property. This Part briefly outlines the history of cultural property protection,
focusing upon the first international agreements to contain cultural property protections and their
failure during World Wars I and II. Part I also explores post-World War II international efforts
to protect cultural property during both peacetime and war. Finally, Part I analyzes U.S. efforts
to prevent the importation of illegally removed cultural property through the application of the
NSPA. Part II discusses the Case of the Gold Phiale, the first civil forfeiture proceeding against an
illegally removed piece of cultural property under the NSPA. Part III argues that civil forfeiture is
an improper mechanism for addressing the influx of illegally removed cultural property into the
United States because it affords no protection to bona fide purchasers. Instead, the United States
should ratify and implement the UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural
Property (“UNIDROIT Convention”), which requires the repatriation of illegally removed cultural
property while providing fair and reasonable compensation to bona fide purchasers.
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INTRODUCTION
In early December 1998, Italian authorities raided the Ca-
tania, Sicily villa of Vincenzo Cammarata,1 known in Italian soci-
ety as Baron Cammarata.2 Six people were eventually arrested
and charged with participating in a criminal enterprise devoted
to the illegal sale of archaeological artifacts.3 Those arrested in-
cluded Cammarata, who fled the scene but surrendered to the
Catania police several hours later,4 and Dr. Giacomo Manga-
naro, a professor of ancient history from the University of Ca-
tania.5 In addition, the police seized approximately 10,0006 an-
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Prof. Daniel Richman for his guidance. I would also like to thank Prof. Patty
Gerstenblith of the DePaul University College of Law for providing critical primary
sources. Additionally, I would like to thank the editors and staff of the Fordham
International Law Journal for their consistent encouragement and assistance. This
Comment is dedicated to my grandmother, Mrs. Yoli Fischman, for her unconditional
love and support.
1. See John Hooper, Italian Art Thefts Linked to Mafia: Alleged Conspiracy Is Filled with
Stories of International Intrigue and High Society, FREsNo BEE, Dec. 10, 1998, at A13 (noting
that Vincenzo Cammarata was charged with conspiracy and handling stolen goods).
2. See id. (describing Cammarata as highly regarded connoisseur of ancient arti-
facts); see also Italian Police Snare "Archaeology Mafia", AGENCE FRAcE-PRutssE, Dec. 7,
1998, available in 1998 WL 16654369 (describing alleged ties between Cammarata and
Sicilian Mafia).
3. See Hooper, supra note 1, at A19 (describing arrest of those engaged in clandes-
tine trade of Italian artifacts).
4. See Italian Police, supra note 2, at *1 (depicting Cammarata's escape through
secret tunnel in his villa).
5. See Hooper, supra note 1, at A13 (describing Dr. Giacomo Manganaro as pillar
of community); see also John Hooper, Mafia Link to Theft of Ancient Treasures, GuARDIAN,
Dec. 9, 1998, at 16 (describing arrest of Cammarata's additional co-conspirators). The
others arrested and charged with conspiracy and handling of stolen goods included a
geography professor from the University of Catania, two businessmen, and a coin
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Interior of gold phiale mesomphalos. The knob in the center represents the omphalos, the
mythic navel of the universe. (© 1997 Ira Block). Archaeology Magazine Homepage
(visited on Dec. 1, 1999) <http://www.archaeology.org/online/features/phiale/
captions/interior.html> (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal).
cient artifacts,7 with an estimated worth of US$66 million.' Po-
lice officials believe that portions of these artifacts are part of the
14,737 items reported missing in Italy in 1997 alone.9 Those
dealer named Gianfranco Casolari who was arrested in Rimini, on the Adriatic coast.
Mafia Link, supra.
6. See John Hooper, Mafia Links to Stolen Relics Probed, ARIz. REP., Dec. 13, 1998, at
A19 (noting that investigators were unprepared for magnitude of artifacts found at
Cammarata's villa).
7. See Roberto Conforti Is Part Sleuth, Part Museum Curator, Part Tough Guy, and Genteel
Art Lover, LETHrRIDGE HERALD, May 14, 1999, at 19 (noting that artifacts seized were of
Greek, Roman, and Phoenician origin).
8. See Hooper, supra note 6, at A19 (describing Cammarata as organizer of illegal
enterprise); see also Italian Police, supra note 2, at *1 (describing location of artifacts in
Cammarata's home). "An impressive collection of vases, amphoras, gems and coins...
lined the walls, cupboards display cases and even the walls of the toilets in his villa."
Italian Police, supra note 2, at *1. Maria Grazia Branciforti, the Catania cultural works
superintendent, upon viewing the videotape the police made of the villa, stated that
there were "more precious objects in the house than in some museums." Id.
9. See Hooper, supra note 5, at 16 (estimating value of illegally removed Italian art
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14,737 items, in turn, represent a small fraction of the total inter-
national trade in illicit cultural property,' ° reaping profits of be-
tween US$2-$6 billion annually. 1
Both the international community and individual nations
have taken steps to prevent the illicit trade in cultural property.' 2
These steps range from new international conventions requiring
the repatriation of illegally removed cultural property,1 3 to na-
tional cultural property protection laws asserting ownership over
new discoveries and regulating the exportation of all local arti-
facts. 4 U.S. authorities recognize these statutory assertions of
ownership and have used them as the basis for criminal charges
under the National Stolen Property Act ("NSPA"),' 5 which pro-
hibits the movement of stolen property in interstate or foreign
commerce, with varying results. 6 In the case of the United States
and artifacts at £150 million annually). Illegal archaeological expeditions are the big-
gest 1single contributor to the illicit trade in Italian cultural property. Id.
10. See Paul M. Bator, An Essay on the International Trade in Art, 34 STAN. L. REV.
275, 285 (1982) (broadly defining cultural property). Bator defines cultural property as
"all objects that are in fact prized and collected, whether they were originally designed
to be useful, and whether or not they possess 'scientific' as well as aesthetic value." Id.
11. See Ana Sljivic, Why Do You Think It's Yours? An Exposition of the Jurisprudence
Underlying the Debate Between Cultural Nationalism and Cultural Internationalism, 31 GEO.
WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 393, 396 n.22 (1998) (noting that illicit trade in cultural
property ranks behind US$500 billion annual illegal international drug trade).
12. See generally I UNITED NATIONS EDUCATION, SCIENTIFIC, AND CULTURAL ORGANI-
ZATION, PROTECTION OF MOVABLE CULTURAL PROPERTY: COMPENDIUM OF LEGISLATIVE
TEXTS 15-42 (1984) (discussing international conventions and various national legisla-
tion prohibiting illicit sales of cultural property).
13. See, e.g., International Institute for the Unification of Private Law Convention
on the International Return of Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects, June 24,
1995, 34 I.L.M. 1322 (1995) [hereinafter UNIDROIT Convention] (requiring repatria-
tion of both stolen and illegally exported cultural property); 1970 UNESCO Conven-
tion on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer
of Ownership of Cultural Property, Nov. 14, 1970, 823 U.N.T.S. 232 [hereinafter
UNESCO Convention] (requiring return of illegally removed publicly owned cultural
property).
14. See, e.g., Law No. 1089 of June 1, 1939 (1939) (It.), [1939] Racc. Uff. 3403
(regulating sale, exportation, and restoration of Italian cultural property); "Federal Law
on Archaeological, Artistic and Historic Monuments and Zones," D.O., May 6, 1972
(regulating treatment of all pre-Columbian cultural property in Mexico).
15. 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (1976).
16. See United States v. Hollinshead, 495 F.2d 1154 (9th Cir. 1974) (affirming con-
viction of smugglers under National Stolen Property Act ("NSPA") for trafficking cul-
tural property deemed stolen under Guatemalan law). But see, United States v. Mc-
Clain, 545 F.2d 988 (5th Cir. 1977) ("McClain I") (reversing co-defendants' convictions
under NSPA for trafficking stolen Mexican cultural property due to vagueness of Mexi-
can statutes asserting ownership over artifacts in question).
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v. An Antique Platter of Gold, Known as a Gold Phiale Mesomphalos,
C. 400 B.C. ("Case of the Gold Phiale"), 7 the United States ex-
panded this legal mechanism by applying the NSPA-for the
first time-in a civil forfeiture"8 proceeding brought against an
Italian artifact imported into the United States by a U.S. art
dealer for one of his customers.' 9
This Comment explores the various legal methods designed
to protect cultural property and to prevent its illegal removal.
Part I examines both international and U.S. efforts to prevent
illegal removals of cultural property. This Part briefly outlines
the history of cultural property protection, focusing upon the
first international agreements to contain cultural property pro-
tections and their failure during World Wars I and II. Part I also
explores post-World War II international efforts to protect cul-
tural property during both peacetime and war. Finally, Part I
analyzes U.S. efforts to prevent the importation of illegally re-
moved cultural property through the application of the NSPA.
Part II discusses the Case of the Gold Phiale, the first civil forfeiture
proceeding against an illegally removed piece of cultural prop-
erty under the NSPA. Part III argues that civil forfeiture is an
improper mechanism for addressing the influx of illegally re-
moved cultural property into the United States because it affords
no protection to bona fide purchasers. Instead, the United States
should ratify and implement the UNIDROIT Convention on Sto-
len or Illegally Exported Cultural Property2° ("UNIDROIT Con-
vention"), which requires the repatriation of illegally removed
cultural property while providing fair and reasonable compensa-
tion to bona fide purchasers.
17. 991 F. Supp. 222 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), affd, 1999 WL 498582 (2d Cir. July 12,
1999).
18. See Jacob M. Hilton, Note, Keep Him on a Short Leash: Innocence of Owner not a
Constitutional Defense to Forfeiture of Property Allegedly Connected to Illegal Conduct: Bennis v.
Michigan, 116 S. Ct. 994 (1996), 28 TEX. TECH L. REV. 133, 134-35 (1997) (describing
civil forfeiture as civil proceeding in rem, against property itself). If the U.S. govern-
ment is successful in a civil forfeiture proceeding, then the owner or possessor's interest
in the property will be extinguished and the U.S. government will take possession of the
property. Id. Property subject to civil forfeiture will usually be either property that is
itself proscribed, known as contraband, or property that is in some way connected to a
criminal act. Id.
19. Id.
20. UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 13, 34 I.L.M. 1322.
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I. U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO PROTECT
CULTURAL PROPERTY
The definition of cultural property, once confined to art,
artifacts, and antiques, has expanded over time to include his-
toric or architecturally significant buildings, ruins, sunken ships,
ecological areas, and religious objects. 2' Similarly, commenta-
tors note that the threat to cultural property, once confined to
wartime pillage and destruction,2 2 has also expanded to include
illegal trafficking during peacetime.23  In response to these
threats, both the United States and the international community
have developed legal measures to prevent the destruction or ille-
gal removal of cultural property.24
A. Development of International Cultural Property Protection
Modern cultural property protection law is based upon the-
ories that have progressed and evolved over centuries. 25  The
21. See Stephanie 0. Forbes, Comment, Securing the Future of Our Past: Current Ef-
forts To Protect Cultural Property, 9 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 235, 239-40 (1996) (arguing that
varying definitions of cultural property led to lack of uniformity in cultural property
protection laws). This lack of uniformity aids smugglers by allowing them to hide or
sell illegally removed cultural property in jurisdictions with limited cultural property
protection laws. Id. at 260.
22. See SHARON A. WILLIAMs, THE INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL PROTECTION OF
MOVABLE CULTURAL PROPERTY 18-19 (1977) (discussing effects of World War I and II on
cultural property); see also JiRI TomAN, THE PROTECTION OF CULTURAL PROPERTY IN THE
EVENT OF ARMED CONFLICT 3-21 (1996) (tracing development of wartime cultural prop-
erty protection from antiquity to World War II).
23. See Ashton Hawkins, et al. A Tale of Two Innocents: Creating an Equitable Balance
Between the Rights of Former Owners and Good Faith Purchasers of Stolen Art, 64 FoRDHAm L.
REV. 49, 49 n.2 (1995) (estimating profits from art theft at US$2 billion annually); see
also Forbes, supra note 21, at 236 (noting major boom in illicit art trade during eco-
nomic prosperity of 1980s). Art theft is the third most profitable crime in the world
today behind the illegal drug trade and arms smuggling. Hawkins, supra, at 49, n.2.
This fact is due, in part, to increased demand caused by the expansion of the art buying
community during the 1980s. Forbes, supra note 21, at 236. New consumers included
investors seeking alternatives to the stock market, criminals attempting to launder pro-
ceeds of illegal transactions, and status-seeking business executives. Id.
24. See generally U.S. v. Hollinshead, 495 F.2d 1154 (9th Cir. 1974) (applying NSPA
to case of artifact illegally removed from Guatemala); 1954 Hague Convention for the
Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, May 14, 1954, 249
U.N.T.S. 240 [hereinafter 1954 Hague Convention] (protecting cultural property dur-
ing armed conflicts); UNESCO Convention, supra note 13, 823 U.N.T.S. 232 (address-
ing illicit trafficking of cultural property during peacetime).
25. See WILLIAMS, supra note 22, at 5-29 (discussing development of cultural prop-
erty protection from mid-eighteenth century to mid-twentieth century); see also KIFLE
JoTE, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PROTECTION OF CULTURAL HERITAGE 25-46 (1994) (discuss-
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first legal principles devoted to cultural property protection de-
veloped within the context of regulating warfare 6.2  These initial
agreements codified the idea that the destruction or acquisition
of cultural property during armed conflicts was not a legitimate
wartime goal.2
7
1. Origins of Cultural Property Protection
The concept of cultural property protection originated dur-
ing antiquity.28 Nevertheless, scholars note that the unregulated
nature of warfare at this time made protecting cultural property
difficult.29 By the time of the Renaissance, ° the movement to
protect cultural property during conflicts gained momentum. 1
ing impact of warfare on cultural property protection from antiquity through World
War II).
26. See ToMAN, supra note 22, at 7-10 (discussing cultural property protections
enunciated in first codes of military regulations and conventions on laws of war).
27. See Victoria A. Birov, Note, Prize or Plunder?: The Pillage of Art and the Interna-
tional Law of War, 30 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 201, 205-06 (1998) (discussing concern
over legality of looting during warfare in nineteenth century); see also WILLIAMS, supra
note 22, at 5 (noting that laws of chivalry and arms contributed to development of
initial instruments on conduct of belligerents during armed conflicts).
28. See Joam, supra note 25, at 43-44 (noting that Greek statesman and historian
Polybius opposed cultural destruction of Greece by Roman forces). Polybius was
quoted as saying that "future conquerors will learn from these reflections not to plun-
der the cities they bring into subjection and not to take advantage of the distress of
other peoples to adorn their homelands." Id. at 44. Another early proponent of cul-
tural property protection was Roman Consul Cicero who condemned Roman Praetor
Verres for plundering the island of Sicily during the first century B.C. and ordered
restitution paid. Id.
29. See id. at 25 (noting that appropriation of cultural property as trophies of con-
quest was main characteristic of ancient wars); see also ToMAN, supra note 22, at 3
(describing seizure and destruction of cultural property as inevitable consequence of
war); ELIZABETH HALLAM, CHRONICLES OF THE CRUSADES 59, 221 (1997) (describing loot-
ing by crusader forces of Jerusalem during First Crusade in 1101 and Constantinople
during Fourth Crusade in 1204); Harvey E. Oyer III, The 1954 Hague Convention for the
Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict-Is it Working? A Case Study: The
Persian Gulf War Experience, 23 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 49, 49 (1999) (describing de-
struction of Islamic sites during Christian Crusades). The promise of plundering a de-
feated enemy was often used to entice volunteers to serve in military campaigns. To-
MAN, supra note 22, at 3.
30. See 1 JAMES H. ROBINSON &JAMES T. SHOTWELL, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE His-
TORY OF WESTERN EUROPE 310-16 (1946) (defining Renaissance as period of prosperity
and refinement in Italian cities marked by rebirth of interest in history and culture of
Romans and Greeks).
31. See TOMAN, supra note 22, at 4-5 (describing views of writers on international
law on cultural property); see also JOTE, supra note 25, at 44-45 (describing views of
Italian legal theorist Alberico Gentili on cultural property protection during armed
conflicts). In 1589, Genteli, in De jure Belli, argued that not only must the cause of war
1999]
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Despite the growing acceptance of cultural property protection,
historians note that the plundering of cultural property during
wars continued during the nineteenth century, most notably in
Europe during the Wars of the First and Second Coalition.32
2. Initial Codes and Agreements
The first instruments containing cultural property protec-
be just, but the war must be conducted justly by making sure that temples and other
sacred objects of conquered territories were spared. JOTE, supra note 25, at 44. EMMER-
ICH DE VATT-EL, THE LAW OF NATIONS 435 (S & E Butler ed. 1805). In 1758, Emmerich
de Vattel, in The Law of Nations, argued that
[flor whatever cause a country be ravaged, he ought to spare those edifices
which do honor to human society, and do not contribute to the enemy's
power; such as temples, tombs, public buildings, and all works of remarkable
beauty. What advantage is obtained by destroying them? He who acts thus
declares himself an enemy to mankind, wantonly depriving them of these
monuments art and models of taste.
VATTEL, supra, at 435. But see HuGo GROTIUS, DEJURE BELLI Ac PACIS, BK. III, CH. VI,
§ 11.1, reprinted in WILLIAM WHEWELL, WHEWELL'S GROTIus 336 (1853) (arguing that pil-
lage of enemies during conflicts was legal consequence of war). Grotius, known as the
father of international law, disagreed with Vattel and Genteli, instead stating that "by
the Laws of Nations, not only he who for just cause carries on war, but any one, in a
regular war, may without limit or measure take and appropriate what belong to the
enemy." WHEWELL, supra.
32. See R. ERNEST DuPuy & TREVOR N. Dupuy, THE HARPER ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MILI-
TARY HISTORY 741-58, 81341 (4th ed. 1993) (describing Wars of First and Second Coali-
tion as conflicts occurring between 1792-1815 mainly between France and allied Euro-
pean countries including Austria, Britain, Prussia, and Russia); see also WILLIAMS, supra
note 22, at 6-9 (detailing Napoleon's plunder of European cultural property); Oyer,
supra note 29, at 49 (describing Napoleon's looting of Italy and Egypt as "rape"). Dur-
ing campaigns in Northern Europe and Italy, French forces under Napoleon made con-
certed efforts to turn France into the reservoir of Europe's artistic history. WILLIAMS,
supra note 22, at 7. During the German campaign of 1794, French forces indiscrimi-
nately seized cultural property from galleries, castles, and religious buildings and trans-
ported it back to Paris. Id. at 7-8. During the Italian campaign of 1796-97, transfers of
cultural property to France were included in armistice agreements with several Italian
States, and with the Pope. Id. at 7. Upon Napoleon's exile to the island of Elba, the
French, with the acquiescence of the allied countries, retained the cultural property
seized during the conflict. Id. at 8. After Napoleon's defeat at Waterloo in 1815, how-
ever, the Duke of Wellington spearheaded a vigorous repatriation effort. Id. 8-9. But see
id. at 9-12 (describing British Ambassador Lord Elgin's removal of cultural property
from Constantinople to England). One scholar recounts that through a mixture of
bribery and threats, Elgin secured permission to remove large amounts of Greek arti-
facts from Constantinople to exhibit the styles to British artists. Id. at 10-11. In 1816,
however, the British Parliament voted to purchase the cultural property removed by
Elgin for £35,000. Id. at 11. One scholar notes, with regret, that this action by the
British government occurred one year after the allies demanded France return the Eu-
ropean art seized by Napoleon. Id. at 12.
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tions were designed primarily to regulate warfare. 3 The central
thesis of these initial instruments was that the destruction of cul-
tural property served no military purpose and thus should be
prohibited.34 As one scholar notes, however, these initial instru-
ments had to be reconciled with the exigencies of military neces-
sity.35
a. The Lieber Code
Despite the continued plundering and destruction of cul-
tural property during the nineteenth century, this century also
marked the first efforts to legislate cultural property protec-
tion. 3 6 In 1864, the United States, in response to the looting
occurring during the U.S. Civil War, adopted the Lieber Code 7
The Lieber Code, compiled by the prominent international law-
yer Francis Lieber, was the first military handbook to provide
for the protection of cultural property during wartime.39 Several
33. See Roger W. Mastalir, A Proposal for Protecting the "Cultural" and "Property "Aspects
of Cultural Property Under International Law, 16 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1033, 1047 (1993)
(discussing initial recognition of duty to protect cultural property during armed con-
flict).
34. SeeJOTE, supra note 25, at 25 (noting that modern warfare excludes indiscrimi-
nate destruction of property).
35. See WILLIAMS, supra note 22, at 10 (noting presence of military necessity reser-
vation in initial cultural property protection instruments); see also TOMAN, supra note
22, at 10 (noting that initial instruments balanced cultural property protection with
needs of military). The phrase "as far as possible" is known as a military necessity excep-
tion, which appeared in most of the initial instruments. TOMAN, supra.
36. See WILLIAMS, supra note 22, at 15-17 (discussing Lieber Code and Brussels Dec-
laration).
37. See Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the
Field, April 24, 1863, reprinted in THE LAwS OF ARMED CONFLIrs: A COLLECTION OF
CONVENTIONS, RESOLUTIONS AND OTHER DOCUMENTS 3 (Dietrich Schindler & Jiri To-
man eds. 1988) [hereinafter Lieber Code] (regulating conduct of Union forces during
U.S. Civil War).
38. See WILLIAMS, supra note 22, at 16 (noting that Lieber Code was produced at
request of U.S. Secretary of War Edwin Stanton).
39. See JOTE, supra note 25, at 47 (observing that European nations used Lieber
Code as guide for drafting their military regulations); see also Lieber Code, supra note
37, art. 35 at 8 (protecting cultural property from damage and destruction during hos-
tilities). Article 35 of the Lieber Code states that "[c]lassical works of art, libraries,
scientific collections, or precious instruments such as astronomical telescopes, as well as
hospitals must be secured against all avoidable injury, even when they are contained in
fortified places whilst besieged or bombarded." Lieber Code, supra. Article 36 states
that
[i]f such works of art, libraries, collections, or instruments belonging to a hos-
tile nation or government can be removed without injury, the ruler of the
conquering state or nation may order them to be seized and removed for the
1999]
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European nations eventually adopted military regulations influ-
enced by the Lieber Code.4°
b. The Brussels Declaration
Ten years after the United States adopted the Lieber Code,
diplomats from fifteen European nations attending the Brussels
Conference of 1874, relied upon it as the basis to construct an
international agreement governing the laws of war.41 Although
the Conference did not produce a binding agreement, it did
adopt a declaration on August 27, 1874 ("Brussels Declaration")
that included articles addressing the wartime treatment of cul-
tural property.42 The framers of the 1899 Hague Convention
with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land 43 ("1899
Hague Convention") and the 1907 Hague Convention Respect-
benefit of the said nation. The ultimate ownership is to be settled by the ensu-
ing treaty of peace. In no case shall they be sold or given away, if captured by
the armies of the United States, nor shall they ever be privately appropriated,
or wantonly destroyed or injured."
Id. art. 36, at 8-9.
40. SeeJoTE, supra note 25, at 47 n.3 (noting that military regulations of France,
Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Serbia, and Spain followed adoption of Lieber Code).
41. See WILLIAMS, supra note 22, at 17 (describing Brussels Conference as first at-
tempt to codify rules of war on international scale).
42. See Project of an International Declaration Concerning the Laws and Customs
of War ("Brussels Declaration"), Aug. 27, 1874, reprinted in Lieber Code, supra note 37,
at 27 [hereinafter Brussels Declaration] (proposing international regulations on con-
duct of belligerents during hostilities); see also WILLIAMS, supra note 22, at 17 (noting
that Brussels Declaration prohibited confiscation and pillage and gave state-owned cul-
tural property private property status); TomAN, supra note 22, at 9 (stating that Article
17 of Brussels Declaration language was carefully crafted to include protection for non-
Christian religious buildings). Article 8 of the Brussels Declaration states that
[t]he property of municipalities, that of institutions dedicated to religion,
charity and education, the arts and sciences even when State property, shall be
treated as private property. All seizure or destruction of, or willful damage to,
institutions of this character, historical monuments, works of art or science
should be the subject of legal proceedings by the competent authorities.
Brussels Declaration, supra, art. 8, at 28.
Article 17 declares that during sieges and bombardments
[a]ll necessary steps must be taken to spare, as far as possible, buildings dedi-
cated to art, science, or charitable purposes, hospitals, and places where the
sick and wounded are collected provided they are not being used at the time
for military purposes. It is the duty of the besieged to indicate the presence of
such buildings by distinctive and visible.
Id., art. 17, at 29.
43. 1899 Hague Convention No. II with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War-
fare on Land, July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803 [hereinafter 1899 Hague Convention].
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ing the Laws and Customs of War on Land4 4 ("1907 Hague Con-
vention"), the first binding international agreements regulating
warfare, added cultural property protection articles based on
those found in the Brussels Declaration.
45
c. The Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907
Scholars characterize both the 1899 and 1907 Hague Con-
ventions as attempts to codify existing international law on the
subject of land warfare.4 6 Article 56 of the 1899 Hague Conven-
tion addressed cultural property, and, like Article 8 of the Brus-
sels Declaration, treated cultural property as private property im-
mune from seizure, damage, or destruction.47 In addition, Arti-
cle 27 mimicked Article 17 of the Brussels Declaration, requiring
that attacking forces take steps to spare cultural property during
sieges and bombardments.4" Furthermore, Article 23(g) prohib-
ited the destruction or seizure of any enemy property unless ne-
cessitated by the exigencies of war,49 and Articles 28 and 47 ex-
44. 1907 Hague Convention No. IV Repecting the Laws and Customs of War on
Land, Oct. 8, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277 [hereinafter 1907 Hague Convention].
45. See WiLLIAMs, supra note 22, at 17 (noting that 1899 Hague Convention with
Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land ("1899 Hague Convention) and 1907
Hague Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land ("1907 Hague
Convention") relied on Brussels Declaration and Lieber Code when drafting cultural
property protection standards).
46. See Oyer, supra note 29, at 50 (noting that 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions
pioneered international effort to protect cultural property during wartime); see also
JOTE, supra note 25, at 49 (describing 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions as first inter-
national agreements adopted for regulating conduct of belligerents).
47. 1899 Hague Convention, supra note 43, art. 56, 32 Stat. at 1824. Article 56
states that
[t]he property of the communes, that of religious, charitable, and educational
institutions, and those of arts and science, even when State property, shall be
treated as private property. All seizure of and destruction, or intentional dam-
age done to such institutions, to historical monuments, works of art or science,
is prohibited, and should be made the subject of proceedings.
Id.
48. Id. art. 27, 32 Stat. at 1818. Article 27 states that
[i] n sieges and bombardments all necessary steps should be taken to spare as a
far as possible edifices devoted to religion, art, science, and charity, hospitals,
and places where the sick and wounded are collected, provided they are not
used at the same time for military purposes. The besieged should indicate
these buildings or places by some particular and visible signs, which should
previously be notified to the assailants.
Id.
49. Id. art. 23(g), 32 Stat. at 1817-18.
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pressly prohibited pillage of any kind."°
The 1907 Hague Convention incorporated much of the
1899 Hague Convention.5 Unlike the 1899 Hague Convention,
however, Article 3 of the 1907 Hague Convention introduced
the concept of reparations.5 2 In addition, a greater number of
nations participated in the framing of the 1907 Hague Conven-
tion than in the 1899 Hague Convention.53
3. Failure of Initial Instruments
Scholars note that while these initial instruments did much
to protect cultural property, the primary objective of the agree-
ments was to regulate the general conduct of belligerents during
wartime.54 In addition, the demands of military necessity ex-
pressly limited the cultural property protection afforded by the
initial instruments.55 Commentators state that these deficien-
cies, in part, led to widespread destruction of cultural property
during World War I and II.56 Yet an additional problem, as one
50. Id. art. 28, 32 Stat. at 1818. Article 28 states that "[t]he pillage of a town or
place, even when taken by assault, is prohibited." Id. Article 47 states that "[p]illage is
formally prohibited." Id. art. 47, 32 Stat. at 1822.
51. See 1907 Hague Convention, supra note 44, Annex, arts. 23(g), 27, 28, 47, 56,
36 Stat. at 2302-03, 2307, 2309 (incorporating Articles 23(g), 27-28, 47, and 56 of 1899
Hague Convention)
52. See id. art. 3, 36 Star. at 2290 (requiring party that violates regulations of 1907
Hague Convention to pay compensation). Article 3 states that "[a] belligerent party
which violates the provisions of the said Regulations shall, if the case demands, be liable
to pay compensation. It shall be responsible for all acts committed by persons forming
part of its armed forces." Id.
53. Compare 1899 Hague Convention, supra note 43 (incorporating views of 26 par-
ticipating nations), with 1907 Hague Convention, supra note 44 (incorporating views of
44 participating nations).
54. See WILLIAMS, supra note 22, at 17 (describing 1899 and 1907 Hague Conven-
tions as generally defining rights, obligations, and limits of acceptable behavior during
wartime); see also JOTE, supra note 25, at 51 (noting that in initial instruments, protec-
tion of cultural property was secondary to protecting human life).
55. See Brussels Declaration, supra note 42, art. 17, at 29 (stating that belligerents
must take all necessary steps to protect cultural property "as far as possible"); 1907
Hague Convention, supra note 44, Annex, art. 27, 36 Stat. at 2303 (requiring signatories
to take all necessary steps to spare cultural property "as far as possible"); see also Birov,
supra note 27, at 208-09 (noting abuse of military necessity rationale led to failure of
1907 Hague Convention during World War I).
56. See WILLIAMS, supra note 22, at 18-20 (stating that initial cultural property pro-
tection instruments were systematically violated and disregarded during World War I
and II); see also TOMAN, supra note 22, at 14, 20 (stating that initial instruments were
both scarcely applied and too narrow to afford sufficient protection to cultural property
during World War I and II).
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scholar notes, was that the weapons deployed during World Wars
I and II unleashed the destructive force of modern weapons, but
still lacked their sophistication and accuracy.57 During World
War I, German attacks against the French city of Rheims,5" and
the Belgian cities of Antwerp59 and Louvain caused heavy dam-
age to cultural property."a International outrage eventually
forced the Germans to take steps to protect cultural property
during the conflict.6 "
At the end of World War I, the victors demanded restitution
of all cultural property in the Treaty of Versailles. a2 In addition,
the international community attempted to address the deficien-
cies of the initial instruments with supplementary agreements.6
Commentators note, however, that existing cultural property
57. See TOMAN, supra note 22, at 14 (describing World War I weapons as lacking
accuracy necessary to protect specific buildings); see alsoJoTE, supra note 25, at 37 (dis-
cussing use of aerial bombardment during World War I). World War I was the first time
aircraft were employed by belligerents. JOTE, supra, at 38. Without previous experi-
ence, it was difficult to apply the initial instruments to air attacks. Id.
58. See WILLIAMS, supra note 22, at 18 (describing German bombardment of
Rheims Cathdral); see alsoJOTE, supra note 25, at 38 (describing German assertion of
military necessity regarding destruction of Rheims Cathedral). German forces accused
the French of stationing troops around the Rheims Cathedral and using its tower for
observation purposes. JOTE, supra note 25, at 38,
59. SeeJoTE, supra note 25, at 38 (describing German aerial bombardment of Ant-
werp, resulting in destruction of ancient buildings, monuments, libraries, churches,
and museums).
60. SeeJ.W. Garner, Some Questions of International Law in the European War, 9 AM. J.
INT'L L. 72, 101 (1915) (describing destruction of Library of Louvain, resulting in loss
of many ancient books, manuscripts, and works of art).
61. See WILLIAMS, supra note 22, at 18. (describing German use of art officers to
protect cultural property under their control in response to outrage over destruction of
French and Belgian cultural property).
62. See Treaty of Peace Between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany
("Versailles Treaty"), arts. 245-47, June 28, 1919, 2 Bevans 43, 157-58 [hereinafter "Ver-
sailles Peace Treaty"] (requiring restitution of all French cultural property carried away
from France by German forces). Article 247 of the Versailles Peace Treaty specifically
required that Germany replace the cultural property lost as a result of the destruction
of the Library of Louvain. Id. at 158. In addition, Article 245 extended restitution to all
cultural property seized by Germany during the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71. Id. at
157-58.
63. See, e.g., Hague Rules Concerning the Control of Radio in Time of War and Air
Warfare, art. 25 (1923) reprinted in 32 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 25 (Supp. 1938) (addressing
protection of cultural property during aerial bombardment); Treaty on the Protection
of Artistic and Scientific Institutions and Historic Monuments ("Roerich Pact"), Apr.
15, 1935, 167 L.N.T.S. 290 [hereinafter Roerich Pact] (codifying first international
agreement dedicated solely to wartime cultural property protection); see also TOMAN,
supra note 22, at 16-18 (discussing origin and creation of Roerich Pact). The Roerich
Pact, named after Professor Nicholas Roerich who suggested its creation, was drawn up
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protection did little to deter the looting of Nazi Germany during
World War II.64
Although German forces caused vast damage to cultural
property during World War I, scholars agree that during World
War II, German forces engaged in a much broader policy of
plunder and confiscation.65 Notable examples of German loot-
ing occurred in Poland,66 the Soviet Union, 7 and France.6" The
record of the Allies, perhaps with the exception of the Soviet
Union,6 9 was much better with regard to protecting cultural
property.70 At the end of World War II, those responsible for
by the Governing Board of the Pan-American Union and continues to bind 11 nations,
including the United States. Id.
64. See WILLIAMS, supra note 22, at 19-20 (describing Germany's complete disre-
gard of 1907 Hague Convention during World War II); see also JoTE, supra note 25, at 39
(describing organized and systematic plunder of European cultural property by Ger-
man forces during World War II).
65. See JOTE, supra note 25, at 39 (describing special German unit dedicated to
collection of enemy cultural property); see also, WILLLAMS, supra note 22, at 19 (describ-
ing German Minister Alfred Rosenberg's complete disregard of international law
prohibiting looting of art galleries, churches, and museums). The German looting
campaign was organized and carried out by a distinct umbrella organization, the Ein-
satzstab. JorE, supra, at 39. Led by Minister Rosenberg, the Einsatzstab was a special
unit, kept separate from the regular army, and, therefore, uninhibited by the military
policy against looting of cultural property. Id.
66. SeejoTE, supra note 25, at 40-41 (describing German looting of approximately
200 Polish villages, castles, churches, museums, and libraries). German forces looted
famous paintings, sculptures, tapestries, and manuscripts from the National Museums
and the Royal Palaces in Cracow and Warsaw. Id. at 41.
67. See id. at 41-42 (noting German looting of 40 railway cars worth of Ukrainian
cultural property). German forces were responsible for the destruction of 427 muse-
ums, 1670 Greek Orthodox churches, 237 Roman Catholic churches, 67 chapels, and
532 synagogues. Id. at 41.
68. See id. at 42-43 (describing instruction issued by Marshal Herman G6ring as
basis for looting of France). According to G6ring's instructions of November 5, 1940,
French cultural property was to be either reserved for Hitler or himself, used for educa-
tion in German schools, transported to Germany for investment purposes, or auctioned
for monetary gain. Id. at 42. French museums in Nantes, Nancy, and Old Marseilles
suffered some of the heaviest looting. Id. Confiscated cultural property included works
by Boucher, Raphael, Vermeer, Van Dyck, Rubens, and Rembrandt. Id. at 43. One
scholar estimates the value of the cultural property removed from France during World
War II at approximately DM1 billion. Id.
69. See Elissa S. Myerowitz, Comment, Protecting Cultural Property During a Time of
War: Why Russia Should Return Nazi-Looted Art, 20 FoRDLi INT'L LJ. 1961, 1989-91
(1997) (describing Soviet taking of Nazi-looted cultural property immediately after end
of World War II).
70. See TOMAN, supra note 22, at 20 (describing French and British public pledge
to safeguard cultural property during World War II). But see B.H. LIDDELL HART, His-
TORY OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR 529-30 (1970) (describing Allied bombing of Abbey at
Monte Cassino). Upon entering the war in 1941, the United States took similar steps,
1999] THE CASE OF THE GOLD PHIALE
the looting of Europe's cultural property71 were among the
tried, convicted, and executed of the Nuremberg Tribunal. 2
B. Modern International Agreements
As one scholar notes, the increased destructive capacity of
weaponry deployed during World War I and II presented signifi-
cant threats to cultural property that the initial agreements were
unable to counter.73 In an effort to address these flaws, the post-
World War II cultural property protection instruments were nar-
rowly tailored international conventions, and focused solely on
cultural property protection during times of both war and
peace. 4 One example of a modern international agreement
first organizing the American Commission for the Protection and Salvation of Artistic
and Historic Monuments in War Areas. TOMAN, supra. In addition, a special corps,
known as the Monuments, Fine Arts and Archives Officers, was organized to help pro-
tect cultural property. Id. Lastly, the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Forces, Gen-
eral Dwight D. Eisenhower, issued two orders containing specific instructions for the
safeguarding of cultural property. Id.
71. See WILLIAMS, supra note 22, at 29 (noting execution of Minister Rosenberg for
plunder and wanton destruction of cultural property not justified by military necessity);
see also OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR PROSECUTION OF AxIs CRIMINALITY, NAZI
CONSPIRACY AND AGRESSION: OPINION AND JUDGMENT 122-23 (1947) [hereinafter "OPIN-
ION AND JUDGEMENT"] (reporting conviction of Minister Rosenberg for war crimes,
crimes against peace, and crimes against humanity). In finding Minister Rosenberg
guilty, the Nuremberg Tribunal held that
Rosenberg is responsible for a system of organized plunder of both public and
private property throughout the invaded countries of Europe. Acting under
Hitler's orders of January 1940... he organized and directed the Einsatzstab
Rosenberg, which plundered museums and libraries, confiscated art treasures
and collections, and pillaged private houses. His own reports show the extent
of the confiscations. In 'Action M' (Mobel), instituted in December 1941, at
Rosenberg's suggestion, 69,619 Jewish homes were plundered in the West,
38,000 of them in Paris alone, and it took 26,984 railroad cars to transport the
confiscated furnishings to Germany. As ofJuly 14, 1944, more than 21,903 art
objects, including famous paintings and museum pieces, had been seized by
the Einsatzstab in the west.
OPINION AND JUDGEMENT, supra.
72. See Agreement by the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland, the Government of the United States of America, the Provisional
Government of the French Republic, and the Government of the Union of Soviet So-
cialist Republics for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the
European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, 82 U.N.T.S. 279 (creating Nuremberg Tribunal); see also
WERNER MASER, NUREMBERG 13 (1979) (describing Nuremberg Tribunal as interna-
tional military tribunal dedicated to punishment of Nazi war criminals).
73. See Oyer, supra note 29, at 51 (discussing new cultural property protection
measures developed in response to new methods of warfare practiced during World
War II).
74. See WILLIAMS, supra note 22, at 52 (discussing shift in focus from destruction
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designed to protect cultural property during wartime was the
1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property
in the Event of Armed Conflict75 ("1954 Hague Convention").76
The United Nations Education, Scientific, and Cultural Organi-
zation ("UNESCO") later supplemented the 1954 Hague Con-
vention with the 1970 UNESCO Convention on the Means of
Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Trans-
fer of Ownership of Cultural Property ("UNESCO Convention"),
which focused on the illegal trafficking of stolen cultural prop-
erty during peacetime. 77
1. The 1954 Hague Convention
Scholars note that the failure of the initial instruments to
deter the looting and destruction during World War I and II
demonstrated the need for increased legal protection for cul-
tural property. 71 UNESCO, whose Constitution mentions the
universal responsibility for protecting the cultural heritage of
humanity,79 was called upon to formulate a new agreement.8 0 In
order to fulfill its mandate, UNESCO organized the 1954 Con-
ference of The Hague,"' which met from April 21 to May 14,
1954,12 and was attended by fifty-six nations.83 The 1954 Confer-
and pillage of cultural property to illegal movement of cultural property); see alsOJOTE,
supra note 25, at 194-95 (discussing international legal measures addressing illegal art
trafficking during peacetime).
75. 1954 Hague Convention, supra note 24.
76. Id.
77. UNESCO Convention, supra note 13.
78. See TOMAN, supra note 22, at 21-22. (asserting that destruction of cultural prop-
erty during World War II and weakness of legal procedures for protection of cultural
property were primary catalysts for new international agreement); see also WILLIAMS,
supra note 22, at 34 (stating that World War I and II showed inadequacies of 1899 and
1907 Hague Conventions).
79. See Constitution of the United Nations Education, Scientific, and Cultural Or-
ganization, art. 1, 2(c), Nov. 16, 1945, 4 U.N.T.S. 276, 278 (stating goal of U.N. Edu-
cation, Scientific, and Cultural Organization ("UNESCO") is to contribute to peace by
promoting cooperation among nations through education, science, and culture). Arti-
cle 1, paragraph 2(c) states that UNESCO will achieve its goal, in part, "by assuring the
conservation and protection of the world's inheritance of books, works of art and mon-
uments of history and science, and recommending to the nations concerned the neces-
sary international conventions." Id.
80. See TOMAN, supra note 22, at 22. (describing UNSECO as most appropriate
forum for improving cultural property protection).
81. See id. at 23 (describing steps leading to Hague Convention).
82. Id.
83. Id.
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ence of The Hague, in turn, produced the 1954 Hague Conven-
tion.84
a. Structure of 1954 Hague Convention
Scholars agree that, although the 1954 Hague Convention
was expressly intended to supplement previous cultural property
agreements,8 5 it in fact superseded the initial instruments. 86 As
one scholar notes, the 1954 Hague Convention recognized that
the modernization of warfare made the initial instruments obso-
lete.87 In addition, unlike the initial instruments, the 1954
Hague Convention viewed each instance of damage to cultural
property as a global affront affecting all nations.88
The 1954 Hague Convention introduced the phrase cul-
tural property, which affords protection to a more comprehen-
sive array of property than previous conventions.89 In addition,
84. 1954 Hague Convention, supra note 24.
85. See id. pmbl., 249 U.N.T.S. at 240 (supplementing 1899 and 1907 Hague Con-
ventions and Roerich Pact). The Preamble of the 1954 Hague Convention declares
that the member states ("Contracting Parties") are "[g]uided by the principles concern-
ing the protection of cultural property during armed conflict, as established in the Con-
ventions of The Hague of 1899 and of 1907 and in the ... [Roerich] Pact of 15 April,
1935." Id.
86. See WILLIAMS, supra note 22, at 34 (describing 1954 Hague Convention as first
comprehensive international agreement on cultural property); see also, TOMAN, supra
note 22, at 24 (noting that 1954 Hague Convention unifies wartime cultural property
protection, rather than relying on scattered provisions of initial instruments); JOTE,
supra note 25, at 57 (describing 1954 Hague Convention as only international agree-
ment for wartime protection of cultural property).
87. See WILLIAMS, supra note 22, at 34 (stating that new methods of warfare placed
cultural property in position of danger not recognized by initial instruments).
88. See 1954 Hague Convention, supra note 24, pmbl., 249 U.N.T.S. at 240 (viewing
damage to cultural property as damage to cultural heritage of world, rather than dam-
age only to cultural heritage of nation in which it is located). The Preamble states that
the Contracting Parties are "convinced that damage to cultural property belonging to
any people whatsoever means damage to the cultural heritage of all mankind, since
each people makes its contribution to the culture of the world." Id.
89. Compare 1907 Hague Convention, supra note 44, art. 56 (limiting cultural prop-
erty protection to historic monuments and institutions of religion, charity, education,
and arts, and science), with 1954 Hague Convention, supra note 24, art. 1, 249 U.N.T.S.
at 242 (affording protection to movable and immovable property, monuments of archi-
tecture, archaeological sites, manuscripts, books, and buildings exhibiting these works).
Article 1 of the 1954 Hague Convention states that
the term "cultural property" shall cover, irrespective of origin and ownership:
(a) movable or immovable property of great importance to the cultural heri-
tage of every people, such as monuments of architecture, art or history,
whether religious or secular; archaeological sites; groups of buildings
which, as a whole, are of historical or artistic interest; works of art; manu-
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unlike the initial instruments, which applied only to conflicts be-
tween nations,90 the 1954 Hague Convention applied to a much
broader range of military engagements.91 Scholars also note
that the enforcement mechanisms of the 1954 Hague Conven-
tion follow the theory of a single, global cultural heritage.92 For
example, Article 28, which addressed sanctions, required that all
member states of the 1954 Hague Convention ("Contracting
Parties") prosecute anyone within their jurisdiction who
breaches this agreement, regardless of their nationality.93
b. Reactions to 1954 Hague Convention
Although the 1954 Hague Convention improved wartime
cultural property protection, scholars criticize Article 4(2), 9
scripts, books and other objects of artistic, historical or archaeological in-
terest; as well as scientific collections and important collections of books
or archives or of reproductions of the property defined above;
(b) buildings whose main and effective purpose is to preserve or exhibit the
movable cultural property defined in sub-paragraph (a) such as museums,
large libraries and depositories of archives, and refuges intended to shel-
ter, in the event of armed conflict, the movable cultural property in sub-
paragraph (a);
(c) centres containing a large amount of cultural property as defined in sub-
paragraphs (a) and (b), to be known as "centres containing monuments."
1954 Hague Convention, supra, art. 1, 249 U.N.T.S. at 242.
90. See, e.g., 1907 Hague Convention, supra note 44, Annex art. 1, 36 Stat. at 2295
(applying laws, rights, and duties of war on armies, militia, and volunteer corps of bel-
ligerent nations); see also Birov, supra note 27, at 214 (noting that initial instruments
applied only to states of war and international conflict).
91. See 1954 Hague Convention, supra note 24, arts. 18-19, 249 U.N.T.S. at 254-56
(expanding cultural property protection to instances of undeclared war, partial and
total occupation, and civil war). Article 18(1) of the 1954 Hague Convention states that
"the present Convention shall apply in the event of declared war or any other armed
conflict which may arise between two or more of the... Contracting Parties, even if the
state of war is not recognized by one or more of them." Id. Article 18(2) states that
"[t]he Convention shall also apply to all cases of partial or total occupation of the terri-
tory of a High Contracting Party, even if the said occupation meets with no armed
resistance" Additionally, Article 19(1) states that "[i]n the event of an armed conflict
not of an international character occurring within the territory of one of the... Con-
tracting Parties, each party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the
provisions of the present Convention which relate to respect for cultural property." Id.,
249 U.N.T.S. at 256.
92. See Forbes, supra note 21, at 244 (describing Hague Convention as premised
upon global cultural view); see also Oyer, supra note 29, at 54-55 (noting that 1954
Hague Convention necessitates international enforcement).
93. See 1954 Hague Convention, supra note 24, art. 28, 249 U.N.T.S. at 261 (requir-
ing that Contracting Parties prosecute or sanction those who breach, or order another
to breach, 1954 Hague Convention).
94. See id. art. 4(2), 249 U.N.T.S. at 242-44 (allowing Contracting Parties to waive
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which creates an imperative military necessity exception. 95 One
scholar is especially critical of Article 4(2) because it creates an
imperative military necessity exception without defining an im-
perative military necessity.9 6 Nevertheless, nations continue to
ratify the 1954 Hague Convention9 7 and it remains the primary
tool for protecting cultural property during times of armed con-
flict.9 8
2. The UNESCO Convention
Whereas the 1954 Hague Convention focused exclusively on
protecting cultural property during armed conflicts, the
UNESCO Convention focused almost exclusively on illegal re-
movals of cultural property during peacetime.99 By addressing
cultural property protection outside the scope of armed con-
flicts, the UNESCO Convention became the primary tool for
combating the illegal art trade. 00
a. Structure of UNESCO Convention
As one scholar notes, the UNESCO Convention's definition
obligations under 1954 Hague Convention when confronted with imperative military
necessity).
95. See ToMAN, supra note 22, at 23 (noting that 1954 Hague Convention at-
tempted to balance cultural property protection with military requirements); see also
JOTE, supra note 25, at 67 (arguing that Article 4(2) can easily deprive cultural property
of all protection under 1954 Hague Convention).
96. SeeJOTE, supra note 25, at 67 (criticizing vague language in Article 4(2)). Jote
also criticizes that restitution of cultural property removed during war or colonial occu-
pation before the 1954 Hague Convention's entry into force was never addressed. Id. at
314.
97. See UNESCO Convention and Protocol for the Protection of Cultural Property
in the Event of Armed Conflict: List of the 95 States Parties (79 States Parties to the
Protocol) as of 14 January 1999, (visited on Aug. 10, 1999) <http://www.unesco.org/
general/eng/legal/cltheritage/hague/rat.html> (on file with the Fordham International
Law Journal) [hereinafter 1954 Hague Convention State Party List] (listing parties to
1954 Hague Convention). The most recent participants are Costa Rica, Zimbabwe,
Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, and Zimbabwe, all of whom acceded to the 1954 Hague
Convention in 1998. Id.
98. See Myerowitz, supra note 69, at 1976 (discussing longevity and continuing ap-
plicability of 1954 Hague Convention).
99. See Forbes, supra note 21, at 244 (describing narrow focus of UNESCO Conven-
tion).
100. See Monique Olivier, Comment, The UNIDROIT Convention: Attempting To Reg-
ulate the International Trade and Traffic of Cultural Property, 26 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV.
627, 642 (1996) (describing main pieces of legislation designed to curb illicit trade in
cultural property).
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of cultural property is highly specific.' °' Furthermore, unlike
the 1954 Hague Convention, which encompasses international
enforcement, 10 2 Article 5 of the UNESCO Convention encour-
ages national protection measures. °3 Article 6 follows this view
by mandating that parties to the UNESCO Convention intro-
duce local export controls to curtail the removal of their own
cultural property.
10 4
101. See WILLIAMS, supra note 22, at 187 (discussing Article 1 of UNESCO Conven-
tion); see also UNESCO Convention, supra note 13, art. 1, 823 U.N.T.S. 234-36 (defining
seven categories, and four sub-categories, of cultural property protected by UNESCO
Convention). Article 1 of the UNESCO Convention states that
the term "cultural property" means property which, on religious or secular
grounds, is specifically designated by each State as being of importance for
archaeology, prehistory, history, literature, art or science and which belongs to
the following categories:
a. Rare collections and specimens of fauna, flora, minerals and anatomy, and
objects of palaeontological interest;
b. property relating to history, including the history of science and technol-
ogy and military and social history, to the life of national leaders, thinkers,
scientists and artists and to events of national importance;
c. products of archaeological excavations (including regular and clandes-
tine) or of archaeological discoveries;
d. elements of artistic or historical monuments or archaeological sites which
have been dismembered;
e. antiquities more than one hundred years old, such as inscriptions, coins
and engraved seals;
f. objects of ethnological interest;
g. property of artistic interest, such as:
i. pictures, paintings and drawings produced entirely by hand on any
support and in any material (excluding industrial designs and manu-
factured articles decorated by hand);
ii. original works of statuary art and sculpture in any material;
iii. original engravings, prints and lithographs;
iv. original artistic assemblages and montages in any material;
rare manuscripts and incunabula, old books, documents and publica-
tions of special interest (historical, artistic, scientific, literary, etc.) sin-
gly or in collections; postage, revenue and similar stamps, singly or in
collections; archives, including sound, photographic and cinemato-
graphic archives; articles of furniture more than one hundred years
old and old musical instruments.
Id., 823 U.N.T.S. at 234-36.
102. See 1954 Hague Convention, supra note 24, art. 28, 249 U.N.T.S. at 260 (re-
quiring that Contracting Parties prosecute those within their jurisdiction who breach
agreement, regardless of their nationality).
103. See UNESCO Convention, supra note 13, art. 5, 823 U.N.T.S. at 238 (mandat-
ing creation of national services for protection of cultural property within territories of
Contracting Parties); see also Forbes, supra note 21, at 245 (describing UNESCO Con-
vention as premised on cultural nationalist perspective).
104. Id. art 6, 823 U.N.T.S. at 240. Article 6 requires that
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b. Shortcomings of UNESCO Convention
Commentators note several deficiencies in the UNESCO
Convention." 5 Although cultural property is defined broadly in
Article 1, it affords a narrow scope of protection, extending only
to cultural property specifically designated by the member states
States Parties to this Convention undertake(s):
a. to introduce an appropriate certificate in which the exporting State would
specify that the export of the cultural property in question is authorized.
The certificate should accompany all items of cultural property in accord-
ance with the regulations;
b. to prohibit the exportation of cultural property from their territory unless
accompanied by the above-mentioned export certificate;
c. to publicize this prohibition by appropriate means, particularly among
persons likely to export or import cultural property.
Id. But see Bator, supra note 10, at 377 (discussing express U.S. reservation to Article 6
of UNESCO Convention). See also JESSICA L. DARRABY, ART, ARTIFACT AND ARCHITEC-
TURE LAw § 6.03[5] (Feb. 1999) (describing U.S. ratification of UNESCO Convention
contingent on one reservation and six understandings). Although the U.S. Senate rati-
fied the UNESCO Convention in 1972, it did so with the understanding that it was not
self-executing. DARRABv, supra. The United States implemented the UNESCO Conven-
tion in 1983 through domestic legislation known as the Cultural Property Implementa-
tion Act ("CPIA"). 19 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2613. See Olivier, supra note 100, at 647-48 (out-
lining articles of UNESCO Convention implemented by CPIA). The CPIA implements
only Articles 7 and 9 of the original UNESCO Convention. Olivier, supra, at 647. Sec-
tion 2606 implements Article 7 of the UNESCO Convention. Id. at 648. One scholar
notes that § 2606 provides the same narrow scope of protection as Article 7 of the
UNESCO Convention, applying only to cultural property stolen from the inventory of a
museum, religious or secular institution, or public monument. Id. Cultural property
belonging to private institutions or private owners, and newly-discovered cultural prop-
erty is not specifically protected by the CPIA. Id. Section 2602 'explicitly enacts Article
9 of the UNESCO Convention, inviting signatories to the UNESCO Convention to ne-
gotiate cultural property protection agreements with the President. Id. Agreements
under § 2602 (a) (1), however, are contingent upon a presidential determination that:
(A) the cultural patrimony of the State Party is in jeopardy from the pil-
lage of archaeological or ethnological materials of the State Party;
(B) the State Party has taken measures consistent with the [UNESCO]
Convention to protect its cultural patrimony;
(C) (i) the application of the import restrictions set forth in section 2606 of
this title with respect to archaeological or ethnological material of the
State Party, if applied in concert with similar restrictions implemented
... would be of substantial benefit in deterring a serious situation of
pillage, and
(C) (ii) remedies less drastic than the application of the restrictions set forth
in such section are not available.
19 U.S.C. § 2602 (1983).
105. SeeJoTE, supra note 25, at 227-31 (providing critical comments on UNESCO
Convention); see also WILLIAMS, supra note 22, at 187 (criticizing Article 1 definition of
cultural property as vague and overbroad).
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("State Parties").1"6 This limitation leaves undiscovered or unex-
cavated cultural property without any protection under the
UNESCO Convention. 10 7
Scholars also criticize Article 7 of the UNESCO Conven-
tion.'0 s Article 7(a) calls upon all signatories to prevent muse-
ums and similar institutions from procuring illegally exported
cultural property. °9 The required steps, however, are limited to
those consistent with national legislation.11 0 Critics note that
this provision renders Article 7(a) moot in nations such as the
United States, where it is possible to legally import an object that
was illegally exported from another nation."'
Commentators note that another flaw in the UNESCO Con-
vention is the narrow scope of the import restrictions in Article
7.112 Article 7(b)(i) requires only that signatories prohibit the
106. See UNESCO Convention, supra note 13, art. 1, 823 U.N.T.S. 234-36 (limiting
protection to specifically designated artifacts of archaeological, historical, literary, artis-
tic, or scientific interest).
107. SeeJoTE, supra note 25, at 202-03 (noting that in developing nations, cultural
property often remains unexcavated); see also Hooper, supra note 5, at 16 (noting that
clandestine archaeological expeditions are largest single contributor to illicit trade in
Italian cultural property).
108. See JOTE, supra note 25, at 214-15 (criticizing failure of Article 7 to address
restitution and recovery of privately-owned cultural property); see also Myerowitz, supra
note 69, at 1979 (noting that Article 7 does not provide remedy for private institutions
or individuals).
109. UNESCO Convention, supra note 13, art. 7(a), 823 U.N.T.S. 240. Article 7(a)
requires signatories to the UNESCO Convention
[t]o take the necessary measures, consistent with national legislation, to pre-
vent museums and similar institutions within their territories from acquiring
cultural property originating in another State Party which has been illegally
exported after entry into force of this Convention, in the States concerned.
Whenever possible, to inform a State of origin Party to this Convention of an
offer of such cultural property illegally removed from that State after the entry
into force of this Convention in both States.
Id.
110. Id.
111. See Nina R. Lenzner, Comment, The Illicit International Trade in Cultural Prop-
erty: Does the UNIDROIT Convention Provide an Effective Remedy for the Shortcomings of the
UNESCO Convention?, 15 U. PA.J. INTr'L Bus. L. 469, 484-85 (1994) (discussing failures of
UNESCO Convention); see also Bator, supra note 10, at 287 (noting that U.S. law will
not disturb cultural property based solely on claim of illegal exportation). Bator notes
that in many art-importing nations, like England, France, Germany, Switzerland, and
the United States, the "fundamental general rule is clear: The fact that an art object
has been illegally exported does not in itself bar it from lawful importation." Bator,
supra, at 287.
112. SeeJoJTE, supra note 25, at 212 (stating that UNESCO Convention creates
loophole by limiting protection to public institutions); see also WILLIAMS, supra note 22,
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importation of cultural property stolen from museums and other
public institutions. 113 As critics point out, Article 7(b) (ii), which
contains the restitution and repatriation mechanisms,114 can
only be exercised in connection with the theft of publicly owned
cultural property. 115 Another problem with the UNESCO Con-
vention is that many art-importing nations like Germany, Japan,
and the United Kingdom are not signatories. 1 6 Australia, Can-
ada, and the United States are the only major art-importing na-
tions to ratify the UNESCO Convention. 11
7
C. The UNIDROIT Convention
In the early 1980s, in an effort to address the shortcomings
of the UNESCO Convention, UNESCO requested the drafting of
the UNIDROIT Convention.11 8 The UNIDROIT Convention is
the most recent international agreement concerning the protec-
at 184 (noting that stricter language allowing authorities to dispossess good faith pur-
chasers of illicit cultural property, and providing for sequestration of such property
during legal proceedings, were omitted from final draft of UNESCO Convention).
113. See UNESCO Convention, supra note 13, art. 7(b)(i), 823 U.N.T.S. 240
(prohibiting importation of any cultural property listed on inventory of public institu-
tion of another State Party). Article 7(b) (i) requires signatories
to prohibit the import of cultural property stolen from a museum or a reli-
gious or secular public monument or similar institution in another State Party
to this Convention after the entry into force of this Convention for the States
concerned, provided that such property is documented as appertaining to the
inventory of that institution.
Id.
114. See UNESCO Convention, supra note 13, art. 7(b)(ii), 823 U.N.T.S. 240 (codi-
fying procedures for restitution of cultural property at behest of State Party of origin).
Article 7(b) (ii) requires signatories,
at the request of the State Party of origin, to take appropriate steps to recover
and return any such cultural property imported after the entry into force of
this Convention in both States concerned, provided, however, that the re-
questing State shall pay just compensation to an innocent purchaser or to a
person who has valid title to that property.
Id.
115. See Olivier, supra note 100, at 645 (criticizing lack of remedy for private own-
ers under UNESCO Convention); see also JOTE, supra note 25, at 215 (noting that pri-
vate owners and institutions cannot seek repatriation of stolen cultural property under
UNESCO Convention).
116. See Olivier, supra note 100, at 646-47 (noting that United Kingdom refused to
sign UNESCO Convention because of broad definition of cultural property, interfer-
ence with ownership rights, and bureaucratic requirements on art dealers).
117. See Forbes, supra note 21, at 245 (criticizing lack of participation in UNESCO
Convention by art-importing nations).
118. See Myerowitz, supra note 69, at 1980 (describing events leading up to forma-
tion of UNIDROIT Convention).
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tion of cultural property.11 9 It addressed two key situations not
addressed by the UNSECO Convention.1 2' The first situation
concerns disputes between original owners and good faith pur-
chasers.1 2 ' The second situation concerns the unauthorized re-
moval of cultural property across national borders.122
1. Structure of the UNIDROIT Convention
Commentators note that the UNIDROIT Convention ad-
dresses some of the issues surrounding cultural property protec-
tion not addressed by the UNESCO Convention.123  The
UNIDROIT Convention affords protection to all publicly and
privately owned cultural property, in contrast to the UNESCO
Convention's requirement that the State Parties specifically des-
ignate all cultural property needing protection. 124 By eliminat-
ing this requirement, the UNIDROIT Convention extends pro-
tection to undiscovered or unexcavated cultural property. 25
119. See Forbes, supra note 21, at 246 (detailing development of international
agreements on cultural property protection); see also UN1DROIT Convention: Signatures
and Ratifications, (visited Oct. 27, 1999) <http://www.unidroit.org/english/imple-
ment.i-95.htm> (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal) (listing nations who
have signed, ratified, or acceded to UNIDROIT Convention). The UNIDROIT Con-
vention went into effect on July 1, 1998 between China, Ecuador, Lithuania, Paraguay,
and Romania. Id. Most recently, the UNIDROIT Convention entered into force for
Brazil, on September 1, 1999, and Bolivia, on October 1, 1999. Id. The Convention will
enter into force in Finland, on December 1, 1999, in El Salvador, on January 1, 2000,
and in Italy, on April 1, 2000. Id. Currently, the United States is not a member of the
UNIDROIT Convention. Id.
120. See Myerowitz, supra note 69, at 1979-80 (discussing gaps in UNESCO Conven-
tion addressed by UNIDROIT Convention).
121. UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 13, arts. 3-4, 34 I.L.M. at 1331-32; Myer-
owitz, supra note 69, at 1979-80.
122. UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 13, arts. 5, 7, 34 I.L.M. at 1332-34; Myer-
owitz, supra note 69, at 1980.
123. See Myerowitz, supra note 69, at 1979-80 (noting that UNIDROIT Convention
addresses conflicts of ownership between original owner and subsequent good faith
purchaser); see also Forbes, supra note 21, at 246-47 (noting that UNIDROIT Conven-
tion provides remedy for private owners of stolen or illegally exported cultural prop-
erty).
124. Compare UNESCO Convention, supra note 13, art. 1, 823 U.N.T.S. at 234-36
(protecting cultural property specifically designated by State Parties), with UNIDROIT
Convention, supra note 13, art. 2, 34 I.L.M. at 1331 (protecting cultural objects that are
of importance for archaeology, prehistory, history, literatures, art, or science). Article 2
does not require that cultural property be specifically designated by the Contracting
State. UNIDROIT Convention, supra. Article 2 only requires that the object belong to
one of the categories listed in the Annex to the UNIDROIT Convention, which repeats
the categories listed in Article 1 of the UNESCO Convention. Id..
125. See UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 13, art 3(2), 34 I.L.M. at 1331 (stating
1999] THE CASE OF THE GOLD PHIALE
The UNIDROIT Convention also addresses the issue of ille-
gally exported cultural property. 26 Article 7 of the UNESCO
Convention required that State Parties take steps, consistent with
national legislation, to prevent the importation of illegally ex-
ported cultural property. 127 Illegally exported cultural property,
however, can be lawfully exported out of art-rich nations128 such
as Egypt, India, and Mexico, and into art-poor nations 29 like the
United States. 130 Article 5 of the UNIDROIT Convention avoids
this situation by requiring repatriation, notwithstanding the laws
of the possessor's nation.' 3 '
The UNIDROIT Convention attempts to strike a balance be-
tween common law jurisdictions-where a thief cannot obtain or
transfer good title to stolen property'12-and civil code jurisdic-
tions, which often bestow good title to stolen property on bona
that cultural objects unlawfully excavated or lawfully excavated but unlawfully held are
stolen).
126. See id. art. 6, 34 I.L.M. at 1333 (requiring repatriation of illegally exported
cultural property).
127. UNESCO Convention, supra note 13, art. 7(a), 823 U.N.T.S. at 240.
128. See Mark F. Lindsay, The Recovery of Cultural Artifacts: The Legacy of Our Archaeo-
logical Heritage, 22 CASE W. REs. J. INT'L L. 165, 166-67 (1990) (describing art-rich na-
tions as those with great stores of both excavated and unexcavated cultural property).
129. See id. (describing art-poor nations as those who seek to acquire cultural prop-
erty for display, study, preservation, rescue, and profit). In addition to the United
States, Germany and Great Britain are also examples of art-poor nations. Id.
130. See Bator, supra note 10, at 287 (arguing that Article 7(a) of UNESCO Con-
vention is moot in many art-poor nations).
131. See UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 13, art. 5(1), 34 I.L.M. at 1332 (or-
ganizing mechanisms for return of illegally exported cultural property). Article 5(3)
requires the return of illegally exported cultural property once the requesting nation
demonstrates
that the removal of the object from its territory significantly impairs one or
more of the following interests:
(a) the physical preservation of the object or of its context;
(b) the integrity of a complex object;
(c) the preservation of information of, for example, a scientific or historical
character;
(d) the traditional or ritual use of the object by a tribal or indigenous commu-
nity;
or establishes that the object is of significant cultural importance for the re-
questing State.
Id., art. 5(3), 34 I.L.M. at 1333.
132. See O'Keeffe v. Snyder, 405 A.2d 840, 843 (N.J. 1979) (describing common
law tradition regarding stolen property). The general rule in the United States is that
"a thief acquires no title to the property stolen by him and can pass none to others
regardless of their good faith and ignorance of the theft." Id.
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fide purchasers. 133 Although premised on the common law tradi-
tion that cultural property must be returned to its rightful
owner,13 1 the UNIDROIT Convention contains express limita-
tions on restitution designed to satisfy civil code nations.' 35 One
example of these limitations is that a claim for repatriation can
be time barred under Article 3(3).136
2. Bona Fide Purchasers
Articles 4 and 6 of the UNIDROIT Convention, in another
concession to civil code nations, provide some relief for bona fide
purchasers. 137 Article 4(1) entitles a bona fide purchaser of sto-
133. See 3 LYNDEL V. PROTr & P.J. O'KEEFE, LAW AND CULTURAL HERITAGE: MOVE-
MENT 396-416 (1989) (defining bona fide purchaser as one who purchased property
from seller, honestly believing seller had right to sell property, and absent any dubious
circumstances that would put buyer on notice to contrary); see also Forbes, supra note
21, at 247-49 (describing differences in cultural property protection between common
law and civil code jurisdictions). As Prott and O'Keefe note, in civil code jurisdictions,
the bona fide purchaser is generally given title to the property in question. PRoTr &
O'KEEFE, supra, at 405. The most extreme example of this principle is in Italy, where
the good faith possessor is given total protection. Id. at 408. See CODICE CMLE art. 1153
(It.). Article 1153 of the Italian Codice Civile (Civil Code), entitled "Effects of Acquisi-
tion of Possession," states that
[hie to whom movable property.., is conveyed by one who is not the owner
acquires ownership of it through possession, provided that he be in good faith
at the moment of [the] consignment and there be an instrument or transac-
tion capable of transferring ownership .... Ownership is acquired free of
rights of others in the thing, if they do not appear in the instrument or trans-
action and the acquirer is in good faith.
CODICE CIVILE art. 1153 (It.).
134. See UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 13, art. 3, 34 I.L.M. at 1331-32 (stating
that possessors of stolen cultural objects shall return them).
135. See id. (barring repatriation after specified periods of time); see also Forbes,
supra note 21, at 248-51 (discussing controversy regarding Article 3(3) time limitations
on repatriation); Myerowtiz, supra note 69, at 1981 (detailing reconciliation of common
law and civil code traditions in UNIDROIT Convention).
136. See UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 13, art. 3(3), 34 I.L.M. at 1331-32
(limiting claims for repatriation to three years from time claimant knew location of
cultural property and identity of possessor and 50 years from time of theft). Article
3(4), however, creates an exemption to the 50 year rule, stating that
a claim for restitution of a cultural object forming an integral part of an identi-
fied monument or archaeological site, or belonging to a public collection,
shall not be subject to time limitations other than a period of three years from
the time when the claimant knew the location of the cultural object and the
identity of the possessor.
Id. art. 3(4), 34 I.L.M. at 1331. In addition, Article 3(5) allows a Contracting State to
extend the 50 year limitation from the time of the theft up to 75 years. Id. art. 3(5), 34
I.L.M. at 1331
137. See UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 13, arts. 4, 6, 34 I.L.M. at 1332-33
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len cultural property to fair and reasonable compensation when
the object is returned to the claimant.138 Article 4(2) states,
however, that reasonable efforts must be undertaken to make
the transferor pay the compensation rather than the claimant.3 9
Yet, if the claimant does remunerate the bona fide purchaser, the
claimant can later recover the amount paid from the trans-
feror.1 4 0
The language of Article 6(1), which addresses repatriation
of illegally exported cultural property, is similar to Article
4(1).' The bona fide purchaser is entitled to compensation
from the requesting nation, but Article 6(3) gives the option of
alternate remedies in lieu of compensation. 4 2 Provided that
both parties agree, the bona fide purchaser may retain the object
under Article 6(3) (a),a43 or the bona fide purchaser may sell or
donate the object to a person residing in the requesting nation
under Article 6(3) (b). 44
In cases of stolen cultural property, compensation to bona
(providing fair and reasonable compensation to good faith possessors of stolen or ille-
gally exported cultural property).
138. Id. arts. 4(1), 6(1), 34 I.L.M. at 1332-33. Article 4 states that
[t]he possessor of a stolen cultural object required to return it shall be enti-
tied, at the time of its restitution, to payment of fair and reasonable compensa-
tion provided that the possessor neither knew nor ought reasonably to have
known that the object was stolen and can prove that it exercised due diligence
when acquiring the object.
IM.
139. See id. art. 4(2), 34 I.L.M. at 1332 (requiring reasonable efforts be made to
force transferor to pay compensation provided this principle is consistent with law of
nation where claim is brought).
140. See id. art. 4(3), 34 I.L.M. at 1332 (stating that payment of compensation by
claimant is done without prejudice to right of claimant to recover it from any other
person).
141. Id. art. 6(1), 34 I.L.M. at 1333. Article 6(1) states that
[t]he possessor of a cultural object who acquired the object after it was ille-
gally exported shall be entitled, at the time of its return, to payment by the
requesting State of fair and reasonable compensation, provided that the pos-
sessor neither knew nor ought reasonably to have known at the time of acqui-
sition that the object had been illegally exported.
Id.
142. See id. art. 6(3), 34 I.L.M. at 1333 (providing alternatives to payment of com-
pensation by requesting nation provided that nation and purchaser agree).
143. Id. art. 6(3)(a), 34 I.L.M. at 1333.
144. See id. art. 6(3) (b), 34 I.L.M. at 1333 (allowing sale or donation of object to
person residing in requesting nation who provides guarantees required by requesting
nation). Additionally, Article 6(4) allows the requesting nation to pursue recovery from
those responsible for the illegal exportation. Id. art. 6(4), 34 I.L.M. at 1333.
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fide purchasers is predicated on a finding that they exercised
due diligence in investigating the status of the object.'45 Article
4(4) lists several factors to be examined in deciding whether the
purchaser exercised due diligence, including the character of
the parties, the purchase price, and whether the purchaser con-
sulted registers of stolen cultural property.'46 The due diligence
requirement, however, is not extended to cases involving ille-
gally exported cultural property.'4 7 Article 6(1) predicates com-
pensation on a finding that the purchaser did not know, and
could not have reasonably known, the status of the object. 1 48 Ar-
ticle 6(2) lists the relevant factors to be considered in determin-
ing whether the purchaser satisfies the requirements for com-
pensation, including the lack of the export certificate if one was
required by the law of the requesting nation. 49
D. U.S. Efforts To Prevent Illegal Removals of Cultural Property
Commentators describe the United States as an art-poor na-
tion, which provides a market for illegally removed cultural
property. 5 ° In order to stem the flow of illegally removed cul-
tural property through its borders, the United States ratified in-
145. See id. art. 4(1), 34 I.L.M. at 1332 (predicating payment of compensation on
finding that purchaser neither knew nor ought to have known that object was stolen
and exercised due diligence when acquiring object).
146. Id. art. 4(4), 34 I.L.M. at 1332. Article 4(4) states that
[i]n determining whether the possessor exercised due diligence, regard shall
be had to all the circumstances of the acquisition, including the character of
the parties, the price paid, whether the possessor consulted any reasonably
accessible register of stolen cultural objects, and any other relevant informa-
tion and documentation which it could reasonably have obtained, and
whether the possessor consulted accessible agencies or took any other step
that a reasonable person would have taken in the circumstances.
Id.
147. See id. art. 6(1), 34 I.L.M. at 1333 (requiring only that purchaser neither knew
nor ought to have known that cultural property was illegally exported).
148. Id.
149. See id. (stating that all circumstances of acquisition should be examined when
deciding whether purchaser knew or ought to have known object was illegally ex-
ported).
150. See Lindsay, supra note 128, at 167 (discussing changes in relationship be-
tween art-rich and art-poor nations during 1980s); see alsoJoTE, supra note 25, at 119
(stating that cultural institutions of developed nations contain large amounts of cultural
property illegally removed from developing nations). Jote states that the trend is for
illegally removed cultural property to flow from developing nations to developed na-
tions. Id.
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ternational agreements, 151  executed bilateral treaties,1 52 and
passed narrowly tailored domestic statutes. 15 3 In addition to
these measures, the courts of the United States, at the behest of
federal prosecutors, expanded the applicability of an already ex-
isting law, the NSPA,1 54 to prevent the entrance of illegally re-
moved cultural property.1 55
1. The National Stolen Property Act
In 1934, Congress enacted the NSPA as an extension of the
National Motor Vehicle Theft Act 156  ("NMVTA").157 The
NMVTA, enacted in 1919, prohibited the interstate transporta-
tion of stolen vehicles. 158  Like the NMVTA, the NSPA, which
prohibits the interstate or international transportation of any
stolen property,159 helped state authorities arrest thieves who
151. See 1954 Hague Convention State Party List, supra note 97 (listing United
States as member nation); see also 1970 UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibit-
ing and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural
Property: List of the 89 State Parties as of 29 April 1999 (visited on Nov. 19, 1999)
<http://www.unesco.org/general/eng/legal/cltheritage/bh572-rat.html> (on file with
the Fordham International Law Journal) [hereinafter 1970 UNESCO Convention State
Party List] (listing United States as member nation).
152. See, e.g., Treaty of Cooperation Between the United States and the United
Mexican States Providing for the Recovery and Return of Stolen Archaeological, Histor-
ical and Cultural Properties, July 17, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 494 [hereinafter U.S.-Mexico
Treaty] (creating mechanisms for return of stolen cultural property by both parties).
153. See Regulation of Importation of Pre-Columbian Monumental or Architec-
tural Sculpture of Murals, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2091-2095 (1976) (prohibiting importation into
United States of pre-Columbian cultural property illegally removed from country of
origin).
154. 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (1976).
155. See United States v. Hollinshead, 495 F.2d 1154 (9th Cir. 1974) (applying
NSPA to case involving illegal removal of cultural property from Guatemala); see also
McClain I, 545 F.2d 988 (5th Cir. 1977), reh' denied, 551 F.2d 52 (5th Cir. 1977) on
remand, United States v. McClain, 593 F.2d 658 (5th Cir. 1979) ("McClain II"), cert.
denied 444 U.S. 918 (1979) (applying National Stolen Property Act ("NSPA") to illegal
removal of cultural property from Mexico).
156. 18 U.S.C. § 2312 (1982).
157. See Kenneth Adamczyk, Case Note, Copyright-Bootleg Records-Copyright In-
ftingement in the Form of Unauthorized Phonograph Recordings, When Such Records are Shipped
Interstate, Does Not Fall Within the Reach of the National Stolen Property Acts: Dowling v.
United States, 105 S.Ct. 3127 (1985), 63 U. DET. L. REV. 843, 845 (1986) (noting that
interstate transportation of stolen cars to avoid local prosecution was major problem
prior to passage of National Motor Vehicle Theft Act ("NMVTA")).
158. See id. at 845-46 (noting that NMVTA allowed prosecution of car thieves re-
gardless of where they transported stolen cars).
159. See 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (1976) (prohibiting interstate or international transpor-
tation of all property with value of US$5000 or more).
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moved between jurisdictions to avoid prosecution. 160 Two cases
in the 1970s expanded the applicability of the NSPA to prohibit
the importation of illegally removed cultural property into the
United States. 6 '
2. United States v. Hollinshead
U.S. authorities first applied the NSPA to a case involving
cultural property in United States v. Hollinshead.16 2 Clive Hol-
linshead was indicted under the NSPA for importing stolen
property-a Mayan artifact known as the Machaquila163 Stele 2
("Stele 2") 164 -out of Guatemala and into the United States. 1 65
A jury in the District Court for the Central District of California
found Hollinshead and one co-defendant guilty, and the defend-
ants appealed their convictions to the Ninth Circuit.1 66
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit examined only whether the
district court's instruction to the jury that there is a presumption
160. See Adamczyk, supra note 157, at 846 (describing original intent of NSPA).
161. See Lynn S. Waterman, Note, Was the Stela "Stolen"?, 2 IND. INT'L & CoMP. L.
REv. 515, 521 (1992) (discussing two cases in which NSPA was applied to illegally re-
moved pre-Columbian cultural property).
162. 495 F.2d 1154 (9th Cir. 1974).
163. See Bator, supra note 10, at 345 (characterizing Machaquila as Guatemalan
archaeological site discovered in 1961).
164. See id. (describing Machaquila Stele 2 ("Stele 2") as "a stunning 7-foot monu-
ment intricately carved with reliefs and hieroglyphs").
165. Hollinshead, 495 F.2d at 1155; see Waterman, supra note 161, at 522 (describ-
ing Guatemalan cultural property law). Under Guatemalan law, all pre-Columbian
archaeological artifacts are property of the State and may not be removed without the
permission of the government. Waterman, supra.
166. See Hollinshead, 495 F.2d at 1156 (affirming defendants' convictions under
NSPA); see also Bator, supra note 10, at 345-46 (describing facts of Hollinshead case).
The facts of the case begin in 1961 when archaeologist Ian Graham discovered the
Machaquila archaeological site, which included the Stele 2. Bator, supra, at 345. Some-
time between 1968 and 1971, the Stele 2 was cut into pieces and brought to Hol-
linshead's co-defendant's fish packing plant in Belize, British Honduras. Hollinshead,
495 F. 2d at 1155. There, in the presence of Hollinshead, his co-defendant, and some
Guatemalan officers who departed after receiving bribes, the pieces were boxed and
shipped to Miami, Florida. Id. In an effort to sell the Stele 2, Hollinshead's co-defend-
ant showed it to several collectors and museums in Georgia, New York, North Carolina,
and Wisconsin without success. Id. Thereafter, the Stele 2 was shipped to Hollinshead
in California, where he offered it to the Brooklyn Museum in New York for US$300,000.
Bator, supra, at 345. The curator of the Brooklyn Museum contacted Ian Graham, the
archaeologist who discovered the Machaquila site, asking his opinion on the authentic-
ity of the Stele 2. Id. Mr. Graham then contacted the authorities, which, in turn, led to
Hollinshead's arrest. Id.
THE CASE OF THE GOLD PHIALE
that every person knows what the law forbids, was erroneous. 16 7
The two co-defendants argued it was the law of Guatemala that
considered the Stele 2 stolen property, and there was no pre-
sumption that they knew the law in Guatemala.168 The Ninth
Circuit stated that the U.S. Government need only prove the ap-
pellants knew the Stele 2 was stolen to satisfy the scienter re-
quirements of the NSPA, not that they knew where or how it was
stolen.1 69 The court held that there was ample evidence for the
jury to find that the appellants knew the Stele 2 was stolen,17 °
and that while the district court's instructions may have been er-
roneous, 171 that fact did not warrant the reversal of the co-de-
fendant's convictions. 172
3. United States v. McClain
Three years after the Hollinshead decision, the Fifth Circuit
addressed the application of the NSPA to the importation of ille-
gally removed cultural property in United States v. McClain.1 7' A
jury in the District Court for the Western District of Texas con-
victed the co-defendants in McClain for violating and conspiring
to violate the NSPA in connection with the illegal exportation of
pre-Columbian artifacts from Mexico.1 74 The Fifth Circuit, how-
167. See United States v. Hollinshead, 495 F.2d 1154, 1155 (9th Cir. 1974) (stating
jury instruction made by district court judge).
168. Id. The Ninth Circuit opinion stated that "[e]ssentially [the appellants']
claim is that the instruction was overbroad and that it should have been supplemented
with or limited by an instruction requested by appellants which made it clear that there
is no such presumption as to knowledge of foreign law." Id.
169. Id. at 1156.
170. Id.
171. See id. (holding that trial judge's failure to instruct jury that co-defendant's
knowledge of Guatemalan cultural property protection law was relevant to extent that it
bore upon issue of knowledge that Stele 2 was stolen was erroneous).
172. See id. (stating that trial judge's instructions, while erroneous, were not preju-
dicial enough to interests of co-defendants to warrant reversal).
173. McClain I, 545 F.2d 988 (5th Cir. 1977), reh'g denied, 551 F.2d 52 (5th Cir.
1977).
174. See id. at 992 (describing charges against co-defendants); see also McClain II,
593 F.2d 658, 660-63 (5th Cir. 1979) (detailing facts surrounding importation and at-
tempted sale of pre-Columbian artifacts from Mexico). In May 1973, Joseph Rodriguez
came to San Antonio, Texas and contacted Alberto Mejangos for the purpose of selling
Mejangos pre-Columbian artifacts from Mexico. McClain II, 593 F.2d at 660. Unbe-
knownst to Rodriguez, Mejangos was Director of the Mexican Cultural Institute ("Insti-
tute"), an educational center sponsored by the Mexican government, but located in San
Antonio. Id. Mejangos, along with the Institute's librarian, Adalina Diaz-Zambrano,
viewed Rodriguez's collection of artifacts. Id. When asked how he had amassed the
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ever, reversed their convictions. 7 5
On appeal, the court addressed the question of whether the
Mexican government actually owned the artifacts seized by the
Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") before the co-defend-
ants removed them from Mexico.17 6 Dr. Alejandro Gertz, a dep-
uty attorney general of Mexico, testified in the District Court
that ownership of the artifacts was vested in the Mexican govern-
ment, by statute, since 1897.177 The district court accepted Dr.
Gertz's view of Mexican cultural property protection law and
used it to instruct the jury.178
The Fifth Circuit upheld the applicability of the NSPA to
instances in which cultural property is exported out of a country
that has asserted national ownership. 179 After reviewing the five
Mexican statutes concerning cultural property protection,8 °
however, the Fifth Circuit held that Mexico did not assert na-
tional ownership over all the artifacts until 1972.181 The District
collection, Rodriguez told Mejangos and Diaz-Zambrano that he had five squads work-
ing in various Mexican archaeological zones who provided him with pieces, a few at a
time. Id. Thereafter, in December 1973, Rodriguez departed San Antonio, but left his
collection of artifacts with William and Ada Simpson, who were authorized to sell the
objects. Id. The Simpsons, along with Mike Bradshaw, then attempted to sell the ob-
jects to William Maloof, a friend of Bradshaw. Id. Maloof, however, felt he was being
swindled and contacted the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI"). Id. at 661. The
FBI launched an investigation and sting operation that eventually led to the arrest of
Rodriguez, the Simpsons, Bradshaw, and Patty McClain. Id. at 661-63. McClain, in ad-
dition to negotiating prices for stolen artifacts, served as an appraiser for the criminal
enterprise. Id. at 661, 662-63.
175. McClain I, 545 F.2d at 1004.
176. Id. at 996.
177. Id. at 993.
178. Id. at 994. The District Court judge instructed the jury that
since 1897 Mexican law has declared pre-Columbian artifacts recovered from
the Republic of Mexico within its borders to be the property of the Republic
of Mexico, except in instances where the Government of the Republic of Mex-
ico has, by way of license or permit, granted permission to private persons or
parties or others to receive and export in their possession such artifacts to
other places or other countries.
Id.
179. Id. at 996.
180. "Law on Archaeological Monuments," D.O., May 11, 1897; "Law on the Pro-
tection and Conservation of Natural Beauty," D.O., Jan. 31, 1930; "Law for the Protec-
tion and Preservation of Archaeological and Historic Monuments, Typical Towns and
Places of Scenic Beauty," D.O., Jan. 19, 1934; "Federal Law Concerning Cultural Patri-
mony of the Nation," D.O., Dec. 16, 1970; "Federal Law on Archaeological, Artistic and
Historic Monuments and Zones," D.O., May 6, 1972 [hereinafter 1972 Mexican Cul-
tural Property Law].
181. See McClain I, 545 F.2d 988, 1000-01 (5th Cir. 1977) (stating that laws passed
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Court's jury instruction that the Mexican government owned the
artifacts possessed by the co-defendants for seventy-five years,
therefore, was held to be erroneous and highly prejudicial."8 2
Based on this interpretation of Mexican law, the Fifth Circuit
reversed the co-defendants' convictions and remanded the case
for retrial at the District Court level.1 83
On remand, a jury in the District Court for the Western Dis-
trict of Texas again convicted the co-defendants for violating and
conspiring to violate the NSPA, and again the co-defendants ap-
pealed their convictions to the Fifth Circuit.184 The Fifth Circuit
prior to 1972 law asserted national ownership over pre-Columbian immovable monu-
ments and movables found in or on immovable monuments). The Fifth Circuit held
that
[o]nly in 1972... did the government declare that all pre-Columbian artifacts
were owned by the Republic. We hold that a declaration of national owner-
ship is necessary before illegal exportation of an article can be considered
theft, and the exported article considered 'stolen,' within the meaning of the
National Stolen Property Act.
Id.
182. See 1972 Mexican Cultural Property Law, supra note 180 (proclaiming state
ownership over all pre-Columbian cultural property discovered within Mexico after
1972). The Federal Law on Archaeological, Artistic and Historic Monuments and
Zones of May 6, 1972 ("1972 Law") states that "[a] rchaeological monuments, movables
and immovables, are the inalienable and imprescriptable property of the Nation." 1972
Mexican Cultural Property Law, art. 27, supra note 180. Article 28 further states that
"[m]ovable and immovable objects, [that are] product[s] of the cultures prior to the
establishment of the Spanish culture in the National Territory ... are archaeological
monuments. Id. art. 28; see McClain 1, 545 F.2d at 1000 (describing grounds for reversal
of co-defendants' convictions). The Fifth Circuit further held that if "an object were
considered 'stolen' merely because it was illegally exported, the meaning of the term
'stolen' would be stretched beyond its conventional meaning." Id. at 1002.
183. Id. at 1004. The Fifth Circuit stated that on remand it was necessary to ascer-
tain when the artifacts were exported out of Mexico. Id. at 1003. The court explained
that
[i]f the exportation occurred after the effective date of the 1972 law, the arti-
fact[s] may have been stolen but only if it were not legitimately in the seller's
hands as a result of prior law. If the exportation occurred before 1972, but
after the effective date of the 1934 law, it would be necessary to show that the
artifact[s] [were] found on or in an immovable archaeological monument. If
the exportation occurred before the effective date of the 1934 law, it could not
have been owned by the Mexican government, and illegal exportation would
not, therefore, subject the receiver of the article to the strictures of the Na-
tional Stolen Property Act.
Id.
184. See McClain II, 593 F.2d 658 (5th Cir. 1979) (granting certiorari to determine
if NSPA properly applies to illegally imported cultural property and if jury should have
decided date that Mexico asserted ownership over artifacts removed by co-defendants).
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reaffirmed the applicability of the NSPA to the facts at hand,'85
but again balked at the District Court's jury instructions. 186 Dur-
ing the second trial, the jury heard testimony from experts on
the relevant Mexican cultural property law.' 87 The U.S. govern-
ment's expert witnesses agreed with Dr. Gertz's testimony from
the first trial, stating that the Mexican government owned all the
artifacts since 1897.88 Rather than rule, as a matter of law, on
whether and when the Mexican government actually asserted
full ownership over the artifacts in question, the trial judge gave
that responsibility to the jury.189
The Fifth Circuit disagreed, ruling that the trial judge
should have determined when Mexico adequately asserted own-
ership over the cultural property in question. 190 The court held
that, based on the evidence presented at trial, the jury would
likely believe that Mexico declared itself owner of all the artifacts
as early as 1897.191 Such a belief, the Fifth Circuit held, would
lead to convictions based on laws that were too vague to satisfy
U.S. legal standards." 2 Based on this finding, the Fifth Circuit
185. Id. at 663-65.
186. See id. at 670 (stating that allowing jury to determine when Mexican statutes
actually asserted ownership over cultural property removed by co-defendants was revers-
ible error).
187. Id. at 667-68.
188. See id. (noting that co-defendants rebutted expert testimony of U.S. govern-
ment witnesses with testimony from Mexican attorney). The Mexican attorney, Ignacio
Gomez Palacio, agreed with the Fifth Circuit's opinion in McClain I, and testified that
Mexico did not assert national ownership over all pre-Columbian artifacts until 1972.
Id.
189. Id. The judge instructed the jury that
[w]hat the United States must prove to your satisfaction beyond a reasonable
doubt is that the defendants knew that the artifacts were in fact stolen under
the laws of Mexico regardless of where they came or from where they were
stolen. And that the Mexican government had in fact effectively adopted valid
laws acquiring ownership of such artifacts, if any, which were in existence at
the time of such theft, if any, and that the defendants knew and understood
such laws and that such laws had been violated.
Id. at 669 n.15.
190. Id. at 669-70.
191. See id. at 670 (holding that Mexico did not statutorily assert ownership over all
pre-Columbian cultural property with sufficient clarity until 1972 Law).
192. See id. at 670-71 (noting that 1972 Law clearly and unequivocally asserts Mexi-
can ownership over all pre-Columbian cultural property). Based on the evidence
presented at trial, the Fifth Circuit stated that
we believe the defendants may have suffered the prejudice of being convicted
pursuant to laws that were too vague to be a predicate for criminal liability
under our jurisprudential standards. It may well be, as testified so emphati-
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reversed the defendants' convictions on the substantive
counts.
193
II. THE CASE OF THE GOLD PHIALE
On November 14, 1997, the District Court for the Southern
District of New York (the "District Court") applied the holdings
in Hollinshead and McClain I and H to a civil forfeiture proceed-
ing brought against a Sicilian artifact known as the Gold Phiale
Mesomphalos ("Phiale").194 The District Court held that an Ital-
ian law asserting dominion over all newly-discovered cultural
property within its borders195 gave Italy title to the Phiale.'96 Ac-
cordingly, the District Court held that the Phiale was stolen
property and that its subsequent importation into the United
States violated the NSPA.' 97 This case was the first time that a
U.S. court applied civil forfeiture to a situation involving the sale
of illegally removed cultural property.'
cally by most of the Mexican witnesses, that Mexico has considered itself the
owner of all pre-Columbian artifacts for almost 100 years. If so, however, it has
not expressed that view with sufficient clarity to survive translation into terms
understandable by and binding upon American citizens.
Id. at 670.
193. See id. at 671 (reversing substantive convictions but upholding conspiracy con-
victions); see also Judith Church, Note, Evaluating the Effectiveness of Foreign Laws on Na-
tional Ownership of Cultural Property in U.S. Courts, 30 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 179, 189
(1992) (detailing Fifth Circuit's ruling in McClain II).
194. See Case of the Gold Phiale, 991 F. Supp. 222 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (ordering forfei-
ture of Gold Phiale Mesomphalos ("Phiale") based on misstatements on customs forms
and violations of NSPA).
195. See Law No. 1089 of June 1, 1939, (1939) (It.) (regulating all transactions
involving Italian cultural property). The Phiale, in and of itself, qualifies as cultural
property under Law No. 1089 of June 1, 1939 ("Law of 1939"). Id. art. 1. Article 1
protects "anything, real or personal, which has any historic, artistic, archaeological, [or]
ethnographic interest[,] ... things which present numismatic interest[,] ... and manu-
scripts, autographs, papers, [and] important documents." Id. art. 1 (a), (b), (c). Article
1, however, does not apply to "[t ] he works of living authors or [works] which have not
been executed not more than fifty years ago." Id. art. 1. Article 2 extends the purview
of the Law of 1939 to "real estate which because of its association with the political,
military history, or the history of literature or art or culture in general has been recog-
nized as having particular important interest." Id. art. 2.
196. See Case of the Gold Phiale, 991 F. Supp. at 231-32 (holding that Phiale belongs
to Italy under Law of 1939).
197. See id. (noting that NSPA prohibits importation of objects known to be stolen
at time of import).
198. See Lawrence M. Kaye, Art Wars: The Repatriation Battle, 31 N.Y.U. J. Ir'L L. &
POL. 79, 91-92 (1998) (describing civil forfeiture of illegally removed cultural property
under NSPA as new tool invoked for first time in Case of the Gold Phiale).
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A. The District Court
Between 1980 and 1995, the Phiale, a fourth century B.C.
gold platter of Sicilian origin, 199 was owned by two Italian art
collectors and one Swiss art dealer, and was eventually sold to a
U.S. art collector named Michael Steinhardt. 200 The Italian gov-
ernment, alleging the sale of the Phiale violated Italian cultural
property protection law, requested that the United States assist it
in securing the return of the Phiale to Italy.20' After locating the
Phiale, the U.S. government instituted civil forfeiture proceed-
ings against the Phiale, which Michael Steinhardt opposed.2 °2
The District Court held that the Phiale was stolen property, sub-
ject to forfeiture under the NSPA, regardless of whether Stein-
hardt knew the Phiale was stolen at the time he purchased it.2°1
Upon Steinhardt's appeal of the District Court's judgment, the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed on sepa-
rate grounds,20 4 refusing to address the propriety of applying
civil forfeiture to cases involving illegally removed cultural prop-
erty imported into the United States.20 5
1. Background
The known history of the Phiale begins in Italy in 1980
when Vincenzo Pappalardo, a private antique collector from Ca-
tania, Sicily, traded the Phiale 20 6 to another art collector named
199. See Case of the Gold Phiale, 991 F. Supp. at 224 (describing Phiale).
200. See id. at 224-26 (detailing known history of ownership of Phiale).
201. See id. at 226-27 (relating Italian request for assistance under U.S.-Italy Mutual
Legal Assistance Treaty); see also Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters,
November 9, 1982, U.S-Italy, 24 I.L.M. 1539 (1985) [hereinafter U.S.-Italy M[AT] (cre-
ating mechanisms for legal assistance between United States and Italy in criminal inves-
tigations and proceedings).
202. Case of the Gold Phiale, 991 F. Supp. at 227.
203. Id. at 231-32.
204. See United States v. An Antique Platter of Gold, Known as a Gold Phiale
Mesomphalos C. 400 B.C. ("Case of the Gold Phiale II"), No. 97-6319, 1999 WL 498582
(2d Cir. July 12, 1999) (affirming forfeiture of Phiale based solely on material misstate-
ments on customs forms).
205. Id.
206. See Law No. 1089 of June 1, 1939, art. 26 (1939) (It.) (regulating all transfers
of title of cultural property defined in Article 1). Article 26 requires that sellers notify
the Ministry of National Education ("Education Ministry") before executing transfers of
title of artifacts defined in Article 1. Id. art. 26. In addition, Articles 30 and 32 give the
state the right of first refusal in the sale of any artifact covered by Article 1 for two
months after the Education Ministry is notified of a pending sale. Id. arts. 30, 32. Par-
ties may, under Article 32, execute a contract of sale for the artifact, but the terms of
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Vincenzo Cammarata.2 °7 In 1991, Cammarata traded the Phiale
to a Swiss art dealer, William Veres. 08 Soon after, Veres con-
tacted Robert Haber,2 °9 who met with Veres and expressed inter-
est in the Phiale for one of his clients, Michael Steinhardt.21 °
Thereafter, Steinhardt, using Haber as an intermediary,
agreed to buy the Phiale for a total price of approximately
US$1.2 million. 211 A sales contract ("Terms of Sale") was exe-
cuted between Veres and Haber, providing, inter alia, a refund
for Steinhardt if the Phiale was confiscated or impounded by
customs agents or claimed by any country or governmental
agency.212 On December 10, 1991 Haber flew to Switzerland
where, on December 12, Veres provided him with the Phiale 213
the contract do not bind the state if it chooses to exercise its right of first refusal. Id.
art. 32. Additionally, under Article 34, the state "may prohibit the sale of collections
and series of objects of private property... when damage may derive to their conserva-
tion or the public may be deprived of [their] enjoyment." Id. art. 34.
207. See Case of Gold Phiale, 991 F. Supp. at 224 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (noting Pap-
palardo's sale of Phiale in exchange for works with value of approximately US$20,000);
see also Hooper, supra note 1, at A13 (noting Cammarata's recent arrest for involvement
in illicit trade of cultural property).
208. See id. at 224-25 (relating William Veres acquisition of Phiale in exchange for
objects worth approximately US$90,000). Veres is the owner of the Stedron art dealer-
ship, based in Zurich, Switzerland. Id. at 225.
209. See id. (describing Robert Haber as owner of New York based Robert Haber &
Co. Ancient Art).
210. See id. (detailing Haber's November 1991 trip to Sicily to view Phiale). Prior
to the transaction involving the Phiale, Michael Steinhardt had purchased 20 to 30
objects from Robert Haber totaling US$4-$6 million in sales. Id. Haber informed
Steinhardt that the Phiale was the twin of one owned by the Metropolitan Museum of
Art in New York and that a Sicilian dealer owned it. Id.
211. See id. (stating Steinhardt's agreement to pay approximately US$1 million for
Phiale and US$162,364 commission to Haber). Payment for the Phiale was to be made
in two equal installments, the first of which was wired to Credit Suisse, New York in
favor of Veres' Stedron account at Bank Leu in Zurich, Switzerland on December 6,
1991. Id.
212. Id. The sales contract ("Terms of Sale") stated that "if the object is confis-
cated or impounded by customs agents or a claim is made by any country or govern-
mental agency whatsoever, full compensation will be made immediately to the pur-
chaser." Id. The Terms of Sale also state that "a letter is to be written by Dr. Manga-
naro that he saw the object 15 years ago in Switz." Id. Haber, however, changed the
clause involving Dr. Manganaro by hand. Id. at 225 n.14. The original typed language
read, "a letter is to be written by Dr. Manganaro which is an unconditional guarantee of
the authenticity and Swiss origins of the object." Id. Dr. Manganaro, in a Report of
Information for Testimonial Evidence, denies agreeing to certify that the Phiale was
authentic, that it was of Swiss origin, or that he had seen it in Switzerland. Id.; see
Hooper, supra note 1, at Al 3 (noting recent arrest of Dr. Manganaro for involvement in
illicit trade of cultural property).
213. See Case of the Gold Phiale, 991 F. Supp. 222, 225-26 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (detail-
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and a commercial invoice.214  On December 13, 1991, Haber,
still in Lugano, Switzerland, faxed the customs invoice and his
returning flight information to Larry Baker of Jet Air Service,
Inc., Haber's customs broker at John F. Kennedy International
Airport ('J.F.K. Airport") in New York. 5 On December 15, Ha-
ber flew from Geneva to J.F.K. Airport and officially entered the
United States with the Phiale in his possession. 16 For the next
three years, the Phiale resided in Steinhardt's New York apart-
ment.
2 1 7
2. Procedural History
On February 16, 1995, pursuant to the Treaty on Mutual
Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, 218 the Italian government
submitted a Letters Rogatory Request 219 to the U.S. government
requesting assistance in reclaiming the Phiale.220 On November
9, 1995, after an investigation by the U.S. Customs Service, cus-
ing Haber's departure for Switzerland four days after Steinhardt paid first installment
to Veres). Haber flew from New York to Zurich, then traveled by land to meet Veres in
Lugano, Switzerland, a town near the Swiss-Italian border. Id. at 225.
214. Id. The commercial invoice described the object as "ONE GOLD
BOWL-CLASSICAL... DATE-C. 450 B.C.... VALUE U.S.$250,000." Id. at 226.
215. See id. at 226 (describing steps taken by Haber and Jet Air to import Phiale).
Jet Air prepared two Customs forms for the Phiale. Id. Customs Form 3461, an Entry
and Immediate Delivery Form, provided for the release of the Phiale by a Customs
inspection team prior to formal entry by Haber. Id. Customs Form 7501, the general
Entry Summary Form, listed the Phiale's value as U.S.$250,000. Id. On both forms,
Haber was listed as the importer of record and Switzerland was listed as the country of
origin. Id.
216. Id.
217. See id. (detailing final payments made by Steinhardt in exchange for Phiale).
On January 6, 1992, Haber or Steinhardt consigned the Phiale to the Metropolitan
Musuem of Art in New York to determine its authenticity. Id. On January 24, the Phi-
ale was declared authentic and returned to either Steinhardt or Haber. Id. Thereafter,
on January 29, Steinhardt wired the second installment of the purchase price to Veres.
Id. The transaction was completed on March 11, 1992, when Steinhardt paid Haber's
commission of US$162,364. Id.
218. U.S.-Italy MLAT, supra note 201; see Case of the Gold Phiale, 991 F. Supp. at 226
(describing Italian government's request that U.S. authorities confiscate Phiale and re-
turn it to Italy).
219. See BLACK's LAw DicTiONARY 905 (6th ed. 1990) (defining Letters Rogatory as
"[t]he medium whereby one country, speaking through one of its courts, requests an-
other country, acting through its own courts and by methods of court procedure pecu-
liar thereto and entirely within the latter's control, to assist the administration ofjustice
in the former country").
220. Case of the Gold Phiale, 991 F. Supp. 222, 226-27 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
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toms agents, acting pursuant to a seizure warrant, 221 entered
Steinhardt's New York apartment and confiscated the Phiale. 222
On December 13, 1995, the U.S. Government filed a civil forfei-
ture action 2 2 3 in the District Court.224 The U.S. government's
complaint alleged that due to the misstatements on the Forms
7501 and 3641,225 the Phiale was subject to civil forfeiture under
18 U.S.C. §§ 545226 and 981 (a) (1) (C).227 As an alternative basis,
221. See id. at 227 (detailing warrant issued pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 545 and 19
U.S.C. § 1595a). Chief Magistrate Judge Naomi Reice Buchwald issued the warrant
based on her finding that the U.S. government had probable cause to believe that the
Phiale was subject to civil forfeiture. Id.
222. Id.
223. See David Pimental, Forfeiture Procedures in Federal Court: An Overview, 183 FED.
RULES DECISIONS 1 (1999) (describing steps involved in civil forfeiture proceeding).
Civil forfeitures proceed in rem against the property in question, rather than against the
possessor. Id. at 8. Once the property is seized, which allows the court to exercise
jurisdiction, the object will be forfeited to the U.S. government unless one or more
parties claim a right to it. Id. If claimants enter the proceedings, then the initial bur-
den of proof is on the U.S. government to show that there was probable cause to believe
the property was subject to forfeiture due to its involvement in a prior criminal act
("predicate crime"). Id. at 15. Once this is established, the burden of proof shifts to
the claimants, who must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that their interests
in the property are not subject to a declaration of forfeiture. Id. Claimants satisfy this
burden by proving that the predicate crime never occurred, or that the property lacks a
sufficient nexus to the predicate crime to warrant forfeiture under the applicable stat-
ute. Id. In addition, claimants often assert the innocent owner defense, arguing that
since they have a legitimate interest in the property, and they did not participate in the
predicate offense, the property should not be forfeited to the U.S. government. Id. at
15-16. In the absence of an express innocent owner limitation in the applicable forfei-
ture statute, however, U.S. courts have held that the innocence of an owner is not a
valid defense to civil forfeiture. Id. at 16; see also, Bennis v. Michigan 516 U.S. 442
(1996) (denying innocent owner defense in case where applicable forfeiture statute
lacked express innocent owner exception); Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co.,
416 U.S. 663 (1974) (holding that, generally, innocence of owner is not viable defense
to forfeiture); Hilton, supra note 18 (arguing against holding in Bennis).
224. Case of the Gold Phiale, 991 F. Supp. at 227; see Confiscation Cases, 74 U.S. (7
Wall.) 454, 456 (1868) (holding that civil forfeiture proceedings are civil suits brought
in name and for benefit of United States).
225. See Case of the Gold Phiale, 991 F. Supp. at 227 (characterizing statements on
customs forms that Phiale was worth US$250,000 and of Swiss origin as material mis-
statements).
226. Id. 18 U.S.C. § 545, in pertinent part, states:
Whoever fraudulently or knowingly imports or brings into the United States,
any merchandise contrary to law, or receives, conceals, buys, sells, or in any
manner facilitates the transportation, concealment, or sale of such merchan-
dise after importation, knowing the same to have been imported or brought
into the United States contrary to law-[s]hall be fined under this title or
imprisoned not more than five years, or both .... Merchandise introduced
into the United States in violation of this section, or the value thereof, to be
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the U.S. government alleged that the Phiale was subject to forfei-
ture pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1595a(c), 228 because it was stolen
property under Italy's Law No. 1089 of June 1, 1939 ("Law of
1939"),229 and thus its importation into the United States vio-
lated the NSPA.
230
On December 26, 1995, Steinhardt entered the proceedings
as a claimant and filed a motion for summary judgment against
the U.S. Government, 2 1 asserting that the Phiale was not subject
to forfeiture under either 18 U.S.C. §§ 545, 981(a)(1)(C), or 19
U.S.C. § 1595a(c). 2  On May 16, 1996, the U.S. Government
filed its opposition to Steinhardt's motion and cross-moved for
summary judgment on its complaint. 233 On November 14, 1997,
recovered from any person described in the first or second paragraph of this
section, shall be forfeited to the United States.
18 U.S.C. § 545 (1976).
227. Case of the Gold Phiale, 991 F. Supp. 222, 227 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). 18 U.S.C.
§ 981(a) (1) (C) states that "[e]xcept as provided in paragraph (2), the following prop-
erty is subject to forfeiture to the United States: Any real or personal property, which
constitutes or is derived from proceeds traceable to a violation of section ... 545... of
this tide." 18 U.S.C § 981(a)(1)(C) (1998).
228. Id. at 227. 19 U.S.C. § 1595a(c) states that "[m]erchandise which is intro-
duced or attempted to be introduced into the United States contrary to law shall be
treated as follows: (1) The merchandise shall be seized and forfeited if it-(A) is sto-
len, smuggled, or clandestinely imported or introduced." 19 U.S.C. § 1595a(c) (1) (A).
229. See Case of the Gold Phiale, 991 F. Supp. at 227 (stating U.S. government's alle-
gation that Phiale was exported in violation of Italian cultural patrimony law); see also
Law No. 1089 of June 1, 1939, art. 44 (1939) (It.) (regulating sale and exportation of
Italian cultural property). The types of cultural property covered by Law No. 1089 of
June 1, 1939 ("Law of 1939") are stated in Articles 1 and 2. Id. arts. 1, 2. Article 1
protects "anything, real or personal, which has any historic, artistic, archaeological, [or]
ethnographic interest[,] ... things which present numismatic interest[,] ... and manu-
scripts, autographs, papers, [and] important documents." Id. art. 1(a), (b), (c). Article
1, however, does not apply to "[t]he works of living authors or [works] which have not
been executed not more than fifty years ago." Id. art. 1. Article 2 extends the purview
of the Law of 1939 to "real estate which because of its association with the political,
military history, or the history of literature or art or culture in general has been recog-
nized as having particular important interest." Id. art. 2.
230. 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (1976).
231. Case of the Gold Phiale, 991 F. Supp. at 227.
232. Id. Steinhardt's summary judgment motion asserted that:
" Any alleged misstatements made by Haber, on the customs forms at the time
of importation were not material, as required by the statutes.
" Steinhardt was an innocent owner as a matter of law under the statutes.
" Forfeiture of the Phiale would violate the Excessive Fines Clause of the
Eighth Amendment.
Id.
233. Id. The U.S. government argued that Steinhardt lacked standing as a claim-
ant because the Phiale belonged to Italy, that neither 18 U.S.C. § 545 nor 19 U.S.C.
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Judge BarbaraJones granted summary judgment to the U.S. gov-
ernment on all grounds.234
3. The District Court Opinion
The District Court, citing McClain II and Hollinshead, held
that cultural property may be considered stolen under the NSPA
when it is removed from a nation that has asserted ownership
through domestic legislation. 235  The District Court relied en-
tirely on Article 44 of the Law of 1939236 in concluding that Italy
had asserted ownership over the Phiale.23 v Once the District
Court found that Italy adequately asserted ownership over the
Phiale, the analysis shifted to whether the U.S. government had
probable cause to believe that the importer, Haber, knew the
Phiale was stolen at the time he imported it from Switzerland.238
The District Court noted several factors that led to the con-
clusion that Haber knew the Phiale was stolen. 239 These factors
§ 1595a(c) provides an innocent owner defense, and that forfeiture of the Phiale did
not violate the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment. Id.
234. See id. at 233 (granting summary judgment to U.S. government based on ma-
terial misstatements on customs forms and importation of stolen property under
NSPA).
235. Id. at 231.
236. See Law No. 1089 ofJune 1, 1939, art. 44, (1939) (It.) (asserting state owner-
ship over all cultural property discovered within Italian borders). Article 44 of the Law
of 1939 states, inter alia, that objects "discovered belong to the State." Id. In addition,
the Education Ministry may, under Article 43, execute state-led archaeological research,
or may, under Article 45, license entities or private individuals to conduct archaeologi-
cal research on both public and private property. Id. arts. 43, 45. Both the property
owner and the discoverer are compensated for discovered works by the State. Id. arts.
44, 45. Compensation may be paid in cash or through the release of some of the discov-
ered objects, but in either case, the price may not exceed one-fourth of the value of the
discovered works as a whole. Id.
237. See id. at 231-32 (detailing report on relevant Italian law submitted by Giu-
liano Berruti); see also FED. R. Civ. P. 44.1, FED. R. CRAM. P. 26.1 (outlining procedure
for interpretation of non-U.S. laws in U.S. courts). Both Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 44.1 and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 26.1 state that
[a] party who intends to raise an issue concerning the law of a foreign country
shall give reasonable written notice. The court, in determining foreign law,
may consider any relevant material or source, including testimony, whether or
not submitted by a party or admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence.
The court's determination shall be treated as a ruling on a question of law.
FED. R. Civ. P. 44.1, also quoted in FED. R. CRam. P. 26.1.
238. Case of the Gold Phiale, 991 F. Supp. 222, 232 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
239. Id.
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included the fact that Haber saw the Phiale in Sicily in 1991,240
that Haber told Steinhardt that the owner of the Phiale was a
Sicilian coin dealer, that the Terms of Sale included a full re-
fund for Steinhardt in the event the Phiale was seized by Cus-
toms or claimed by a country or governmental agency,2 41 and
that Haber changed the clause pertaining to Dr. Manganaro's
guarantee in the Terms of Sale.242 Based on these determina-
tions, the District Court ruled that the U.S. government had
probable cause to believe Haber knew the Phiale was stolen
property and, thus, the Phiale was subject to forfeiture under 19
U.S.C. § 1595a(c).243 The District Court found that Steinhardt
offered no evidence to imply that the Phiale was not subject to
forfeiture, and, since § 1595a(c) contains no express innocent
owner provision, it granted the U.S. government's motion for
summary judgment.24 4 Steinhardt immediately filed an appeal
with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, but the
appellate court affirmed the District Court's ruling on July 12,
1999.245
240. See id. (stating that Haber viewed Phiale in November 1991, when visiting
Veres in Sicily).
241. See id. (quoting text of Terms of Sale providing refund in event of seizure or
forfeiture).
242. See Case of the Gold Phiale, 991 F. Supp. at 232 (detailing changes to Terms of
Sale allegedly made by Haber). In addition, the District Court pointed out that Haber
made sure the Phiale was exported from Switzerland, rather than Italy, and that Haber
imported the Phiale into the United States using two materially false Customs forms.
Id. The District Court also noted that, following the seizure of the Phiale, Haber in-
voked his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination at a deposition and refused
to answer any questions regarding the purchase and sale of the Phiale. Id. The District
Court, based on Haber's invocation of the Fifth Amendment, drew the adverse infer-
ence that Haber knew the Phiale was stolen at the time he imported it into the United
States. Id.; see also Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 318 (1976) (holding that Fifth
Amendment does not prohibit adverse inferences against participants in civil actions
when participants refuse to testify in response to probative evidence proffered against
them).
243. Case of the Gold Phiale, 991 F. Supp. 222, 232 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
244. Id.
245. See Case of the Gold Phiale II, No. 97-6319, 1999 WL 498582 (2d Cir.July 12,
1999) (affirming summary judgment for U.S. government in civil forfeiture proceed-
ing). The U.S. government reiterated its position that the Phiale was subject forfeiture
under 18 U.S.C. § 545 for the misstatements on the customs forms and under 19 U.S.C.
§ 1595a for violations of the NSPA. Id. The Second Circuit affirmed the forfeiture
under § 545, but did not reach the issue of the applicability of the NSPA, instead hold-
ing that
the district court found that summary judgment was proper on either of two
independent bases. We hold that importation of the Phiale violated 18 U.S.C.
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III. THE UNITED STATES SHOULD RATIFY AND IMPLEMENT
THE UNIDROIT CONVENTION, WHICH ENCOURAGES THE
REPATRIATION OF ILLEGALLY REMOVED CULTURAL
PROPERTY WHILE PROTECTING THE INTERESTS OF
BONA F1DE PURCHASERS
The District Court's decision in the Case of the Gold Phiale2 46
demonstrates that civil forfeiture is an improper mechanism for
addressing the importation of illegally removed cultural prop-
erty into the United States. The equitable differences between
prosecuting cultural property smugglers under the NSPA, as the
U.S. government did in Hollinshead and McClain, and using viola-
tions of the NSPA as the predicate crime in a civil forfeiture pro-
ceeding against an artifact possessed not by a smuggler, but by a
subsequent U.S. purchaser, are distinct. U.S. civil forfeiture law
strips illegally removed cultural property from all U.S. purchas-
ers-without compensation-regardless of whether they demon-
strated good faith when acquiring the artifact. The only instance
when this situation will not occur is where the applicable U.S.
civil forfeiture statute contains an innocent owner provision,24
7
which, in turn, frustrates the claims of original owners by al-
lowing the purchaser to retain possession of the artifact. The
UNIDROIT Convention, which requires repatriation of all ille-
gally removed cultural property, but which also mandates fair
and reasonable compensation for purchasers who acted with
due diligence while investigating the status of the artifact, strikes
the proper balance between the noble cause of repatriation and
the interests of bona fide purchasers.
A. Differences Between the Case of the Gold Phiale and
Hollinshead and McClain
There are important differences between the prior deci-
sions in Hollinshead and McClain and the recent decision in the
Case of the Gold Phiale that explain why the U.S. government
§ 545 because of the false statements on the customs forms. We need not,
therefore, address whether the NSPA incorporated concepts of property such
as those contained in the Italian patrimony laws.
Id.
246. See supra notes 218-27 and accompanying text (discussing District Court's
grant of summary judgment to U.S. government based on violations of NSPA).
247. See supra note 223 (discussing use of innocent owner defense in civil forfei-
ture proceedings).
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chose-for the first time-to pursue forfeiture of a piece of cul-
tural property for violating the NSPA.24 Both Hollinshead and
McClain were criminal prosecutions under the NSPA involving
smugglers of illegally removed cultural property.249 The applica-
ble statutory language of the NSPA requires that a defendant
must know that the property he or she is transporting in inter-
state or international commerce is stolen. 25 ° There was ample
evidence that the co-defendants in both Hollinshead and McClain
knew beyond a reasonable doubt that the artifacts involved were
stolen, 251 thus making a criminal conviction under the NSPA
probable. In reviewing the District Court's findings of fact in the
Case of the Gold Phiale, however, there was little evidence to sup-
port an assertion that Steinhardt knew-beyond a reasonable
doubt-that the Phiale was stolen property. 252 The only person
involved in the Case of the Gold Phiale who satisfied the knowledge
requirements of the NSPA and, thus, qualified for criminal
charges was Steinhardt's intermediary, Michael Haber. 25" This
may be the reason that Haber refused to answer any questions
related to the importation or sale of the Phiale.254
Additionally, in Hollinshead and McClain I and II, the co-de-
fendants were arrested before they sold the illegally removed ar-
tifacts. 255 Criminally prosecuting the co-defendants in those
cases served the dual purpose of punishing the smugglers and
248. See supra note 198 (discussing new tools employed by U.S. government to ad-
dress importation of illegally removed cultural property into United States).
249. See United States v. Hollinshead, 495 F.2d 1154, 1155 (9th Cir. 1974) (describ-
ing attempts by co-defendants to sell illegally removed Guatemalan cultural property to
various collectors and museums in United States); McClain II, 593 F.2d 658, 660
(describing methods used by smugglers to obtain and sell illegally removed Mexican
cultural property); see also Bator, supra note 10, at 345-50 (describing facts of Hollinshead
and McClain).
250. See 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (1976) (predicating liability under NSPA on defendant
knowing property was stolen and that property was worth US$5000 or more).
251. See supra note 166 (describing actions of co-defendants in Holinshead); see also
supra note 174 (describing facts leading up to arrest of co-defendants in McClain case).
252. See supra notes 205-12 and accompanying text (discussing facts surrounding
purchase of Phiale by Steinhardt).
253. See supra notes 207-12 and accompanying text (describing Haber's role in im-
portation of Phiale).
254. See supra note 242 (discussing Haber's assertion of his right against self-in-
crimination at deposition).
255. See United States v. Hollinshead, 495 F.2d 1154, 1155 (9th Cir. 1974) (stating
that co-defendants were unsuccessful in attempts to sell Stele 2 prior to their arrest);
McClain II, 593 F.2d 658, 663 (5th Cir. 1979) (noting arrest of co-defendants while
trying to sell illegally removed Mexican cultural property to undercover FBI agents).
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providing for the return of the illegally removed artifacts. In the
Case of the Gold Phiale, Steinhardt secured possession of the Phi-
ale from Haber three years before the U.S. Customs Service be-
gan its investigation.256 Criminally prosecuting Haber under the
NSPA alone would not help Italy reclaim the Phiale.
B. Applying the UNIDROIT Convention to the Case of the Gold
Phiale Balances the Need for Repatriation with the Need To Protect
Bona Fide Purchasers
Civil forfeiture is an unwieldy mechanism when applied to
illegally removed cultural property. In this context, civil forfei-
ture proceedings either strip possessors of illegally removed cul-
tural property, thereby punishing bona fide purchasers, or, if the
applicable forfeiture statute contains an innocent owner excep-
tion, allow any possessor to retain ownership of the artifact, to
the detriment of the original owner. Conversely, the
UNIDROIT Convention requires compulsory repatriation of ille-
gally removed cultural property, but furnishes the dispossessed
purchaser with fair and reasonable compensation, provided he
or she performed due diligence in investigating the status of the
artifact prior to purchasing it.
1. Problems With Applying Civil Forfeiture in the Case Involving
Illegally Removed Cultural Property
The main problem with applying civil forfeiture in cases in-
volving illegally removed cultural property is that the civil forfei-
ture statutes provide either too little or too much protection to
bona fide purchasers. According to the U.S. Supreme Court, ab-
sent a statutory declaration to the contrary,2 the innocence of
an owner of property subject to civil forfeiture is not a de-
fense.2 58 Civil forfeiture is too extreme because it does not pro-
256. See supra text accompanying notes 196-98 (discussing Italy's Letters Rogatory
Request for help in securing return of Phiale).
257. See, e.g. 18 U.S.C. § 981 (a) (2) (limiting forfeiture of property involved in
money laundering to interests of those with knowledge of criminal activity). 18 U.S.C.
§ 981 (a) (2) states that "[n]o property shall be forfeited under this section to the extent
of the interest of an owner or lienholder by reason of any act or omission established by
that owner of lienholder to have been committed without the knowledge of that owner
or lienholder." Id.
258. See, e.g., Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442 (1996) (holding that car owned by
both husband and wife was subject to forfeiture even though only husband violated
Michigan indecency law); see also Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S.
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vide protection to bona fide purchasers. In civil forfeiture ac-
tions, the good faith efforts of a bona fide purchaser to ascertain
the status of an artifact will not effect the proceedings. If the
applicable statute does not contain an express innocent owner
provision, then the artifact will be forfeited to the U.S. govern-
ment. It is not hard to conceive of a situation in which a piece of
cultural property changes hands so many times that it is nearly
impossible for a purchaser to ascertain the circumstances under
which it was first removed from its country of origin. Under the
holding in the Case of the Gold Phiale, however, that artifact would
still be subject to civil forfeiture, regardless of the purchaser's
good faith. Although bona fide purchaser status should not pre-
vent repatriation of illegally removed cultural property, it also
should not be ignored.
In addition to issues of fairness, enforcement poses other
potential problems when relying on civil forfeiture in cases in-
volving illegally removed cultural property. Civil forfeitures are
civil suits instituted by the U.S. government at the discretion of
federal prosecutors under the Attorney General.259 When provi-
sions punish innocent owners, enforcement agencies and fed-
eral prosecutors may be less likely to employ them, thus resulting
in fewer repatriations of illegally removed cultural property.
One way to protect the interests of bona fide purchasers
would be to amend statutes like 19 U.S.C. § 1595a(c) to include
innocent owner provisions. This method, however, creates too
much protection for bona fide purchasers. If an innocent owner
provision were added, then the bona fide purchaser would be al-
lowed to retain the artifact. This step shifts the balance too far
in favor of the bona fide purchaser and completely frustrates the
interests of the rightful claimant.
663 (1974) (holding that innocence of owner of property subject to forfeiture is not
viable defense).
259. See Confiscation Cases, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 454, 456 (1868) (stating that civil
suits, in name and for benefit of United States, are under control of prosecutor and
Attorney General); see also Hilton, supra note 18, at 155 (arguing that Bennis decision
encourages reliance on prosecutorial discretion to protect innocent owners in forfei-
ture proceedings rather than including innocent owner provisions in forfeiture stat-
utes).
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2. Benefits of Applying the UNIDROIT Convention in Cases
Involving Illegally Removed Cultural Property
It is important to note that the UNIDROIT Convention is
predicated on the concept of repatriation. 26  Under the
UNIDROIT Convention, stolen or illegally exported cultural
property will be returned to the rightful claimant regardless of
whether the possessor is a bona fide purchaser or not.2 61 Unlike
civil forfeiture actions under 19 U.S.C. § 1595a(c), however, the
UNIDROIT Convention balances compulsory repatriation with
financial compensation for bona fide purchasers. In addition, it
is important to note that the UNIDROIT Convention does not
force the rightful claimant to pay the compensation outright.26 2
Before a claimant must pay compensation to a bona fide pur-
chaser, reasonable efforts must be made to exact compensation
from any prior transferor when doing so is consistent with the
law of the nation in which the claim is brought.263 This measure
properly places liability for compensation on the wrongdoer, but
does not do so at the expense of the bonafide purchaser, who will
be paid by the claimant if the wrongdoer cannot be located.2 6 4
3. Applying the UNIDROIT Convention to the
Case of the Gold Phiale
In the Case of the Gold Phiale, Article 4 of the UNIDROIT
Convention would require that Steinhardt return the Phiale to
Italy. Unlike civil forfeiture actions, however, under the
UNIDROIT Convention, Steinhardt would be given the opportu-
nity to prove that he was a bona fide purchaser who deserved
265compensation. According to Article 4(1), compensation will
260. See UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 13, art. 3, 34 I.L.M. at 1331 (stating
that possessors of stolen cultural objects shall return them).
261. Id. Under the UNIDROIT Convention, the only instance in which cultural
property will not be returned to the original owner when a nation requests the return
of an illegally exported object. Id. art. 6(3), 34 I.L.M. at 1333; see supra notes 131-33
and accompanying text (discussing exception to repatriation of illegally exported cul-
tural property).
262. See supra note 139 (discussing Article 4(2) requirement that reasonable ef-
forts be made to make seller of stolen artifacts pay compensation owed to bona fide
purchaser).
263. Id.
264. See supra note 140 and accompanying text (noting that claimant may later
recover compensation paid to bona fide purchaser from prior transferor).
265. See supra note 146 (discussing application of Article 4(4) of UNIDROIT Con-
vention to stolen cultural property).
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be withheld if the purchaser fails to exercise due diligence while
investigating the status of the object. Steinhardt, however, failed
to satisfy the due diligence requirement. There is no evidence
that Steinhardt contacted any authorities to request information
on the status of the Phiale, consulted any register of stolen cul-
tural property, or took any other steps that Article 4(4) suggests
would be consistent with a finding of due diligence. 266 Addition-
ally, the provision in the Terms of Sale awarding Steinhardt a
refund if customs agents seized the Phiale would further damage
Steinhardt's claim of bona fide purchaser status.2 67 These facts
preclude a finding of due diligence. Steinhardt's only remedy,
therefore, would be a civil suit against Haber seeking enforce-
ment of the refund provision in the Terms of Sale.
CONCLUSION
The UNIDROIT Convention accomplishes three important
goals when applied to cases involving subsequent sales of illegally
removed cultural property. Under the UNIDROIT Convention,
illegally removed cultural property must be returned to the origi-
nal owner, but, when subsequent possessors are bona fide pur-
chasers, the UNIDROIT Convention provides them with fair and
reasonable compensation. This compensation comes primarily
from the prior transferors who are more likely to have knowingly
trafficked the stolen artifacts. Conversely, civil forfeiture is a
cumbersome and overly-punitive mechanism that penalizes sub-
sequent bona fide purchasers of illegally removed cultural prop-
erty. Equity demands that a system be developed in the United
States that defends the rights of both the original owners and
subsequent bona fide purchasers. The U.S. government should
ratify and implement the UNIDROIT Convention, the only cur-
rent legislation that adequately balances the interests of both
bona fide purchasers and original owners of illegally removed cul-
tural property.
266. See id. (listing factors to be examined in determining whether purchaser exer-
cised due diligence).
267. See supra note 212 (discussing provision in Terms of Sale guaranteeing refund
for Steinhardt in event Phiale was confiscated by customs agents).
